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THE CHALLENGES OF EUROPEANIZATION IN
THE REALM OF PRIVATE LAW: A PLEA FOR A
NEW LEGAL DISCIPLINE*
CHRISTIAN JOERGES**
ABSTRACT
There are good reasons to expect that the process of European integration might bring about a renaissance of both comparative and private international law—the two disciplines in which Herbert Bernstein had excelled
in both New and Old World alike. To be sure, Europe’s legal systems must
respond to processes of economic and political integration. Nevertheless, it
seems quite unrealistic to expect from the European Union any comprehensive harmonization of private law, as Europe’s systems of private law are

* This article is a revised version of the Second Annual Herbert L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture
delivered on September 16, 2003 at the Duke University School of Law in Durham, North Carolina. I
am indebted to many commentators, both at Duke and elsewhere, for their constructive critiques of earlier drafts, in particular to Ralf Michaels in Durham, N.C., Christoph Schmid in Munich and Florence,
Isabel Jaramillo in Cambridge, Massachusetts and Luca Di Preso in Florence. And I owe many thanks
to Robert Gallagher, editor of the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law for the work he
has invested on this manuscript.
** Professor Christian Joerges, Professor of Economic Law, Centre for European Law and Politics at the University of Bremen and European University Institute, Florence, Italy. “L’éssentiel est
invisible pour les yeux,” explains le petit prince in Antoine de Saint Exupéry’s famous novel—and
hosts at Duke could not possibly know all of the reasons which made their invitation so precious to me.
My doctoral dissertation dealt with the conflict of laws methodology of one of Duke Law’s famous
scholars, the late Brainerd Currie. See CHRISTIAN JOERGES, ZUM FUNKTIONSWANDEL DES
KOLLISIONSRECHTS: DIE “GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST ANALYSIS” UND DIE “KRISE DES
INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS” (1971). This thesis, written under the supervision of Rudolf
Wiethölter and Heinrich Kronstein, used Currie’s critique of traditional (American) conflict of laws
scholarship as a basis for a critique of the Savignian tradition in German private international law. It
obtained an optimal assessment in Frankfurt but the quest for publication in the prestigious series of
Hamburg’s famous Max Planck Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht caused some
frowning in the Institute’s directorate. Konrad Zweigert, however, was fair enough to ask for a review
by a young professor whose authority in the field was undisputable. It was none other than Herbert
Bernstein, who defended my work—and my chances for an academic career. Decades later, at a conference in Bonn on emigrants from Nazi Germany to the United States, I realized that we shared a concern for Germany’s darker past, but only at Duke did I learn about Herbert Bernstein’s personal history
told so movingly by Paul H. Haagen in this Journal. See Paul H. Haagen, A Hamburg Childhood: The
Early Life of Herbert Bernstein, 13 DUKE J. COMP. INT’L L. 7, 7–60 (2003). These are all good reasons
to be grateful for the invitation to Duke, but I would like to mention another—the wonderful hospitality
I experienced during my visit to Durham, North Carolina.
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deeply entwined in the economic and political histories of the polities
which they order and to which they owe their legitimacy. Europe’s identity
is defined by the diversity of its legal heritage. Should not deepened comparative studies prepare and accompany the search for a Europeanized private law system? Further, is it not the very vocation of private international law to organize constructive responses to legal diversity?
Pertinent efforts have been undertaken and are under way. And yet,
this essay argues that the Europeanization process follows a logic of its
own, with which none of our inherited legal disciplines currently seem able
to cope. Three difficulties will be discussed. One is inherent in the very
general developments of “post-classical” private law, in particular its linkages with regulatory and distributive policies and its opening to social values and human rights. Comparative law has often furthered and private international law has adapted to this (in Germany) so-called materialization
process. Europeanization, however, adds challenging new dimensions.
These dimensions are inherent in the multilevel structures of the European
polity and hence inevitable. The interventions of European law into general private law (the codified systems of continental Europe and the common law of the United Kingdom) have so far been quite marginal. Yet
Europe has very intensively and quite comprehensively reorganized the
regulatory framework of private transactions, whereas the distributive welfare state institutions in which private relations are embedded have remained the domain of national legal systems. The Europeanization of private law is therefore to a large degree about the restructuring of the
linkages of private law with its (Europeanized) regulatory environment and
the manner in which it is embedded in welfare state institutions. Europeanization affects this dimension through the freedoms it grants to European
citizens.
European law is a transformative discipline. It requires respect for its
principles and the regulatory prescription it imposes in the realms of the
enumerated competencies of the European legislature. It cannot, however,
provide comprehensive responses to its quests for change. Europeanization
affects national systems of private law only selectively. The process of
change is incremental and this essay, therefore, does not try to present the
Europeanization of private law as the building of a new system of rules and
principles. Rather, it presents and explores patterns of legal change in three
cases of exemplary importance.
As will become apparent, neither comparative law, nor private international law, nor European law, can lay claim to exclusive leadership in the
Europeanization process. Europeanization is generating a new legal discipline. The challenging task of this discipline is to provide normative guid-
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ance for the operation of private law within the multilevel system of governance that Europe has become.
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INTRODUCTION
In what way can one expose an American readership to the particular
challenges of the Europeanization of private law? Comprehensive reports
on the state of legal developments and academic debates are currently not
conceivable. The study of the Europeanization of private law is an expand-
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ing discipline, and is growing at exponential rates. Germany is certainly
the most prolific of all European legal communities, boasting a production
of not less than eleven habilitations theses defended over the last few years,
many more than several hundred pages each.1 The Netherlands is hardly
less active, and is arguably more effective because it tends to give up the
use of its own language in its habilitations.2 Ever more jurisdictions make
their views known and the epistemic community is Europeanizing. Indeed,
conferences on European private law have long been multinational, transnational working groups and academic societies have been established,3
and the annual meetings of the Common Core project in Trento attract ever
more attention—even overseas.4 Meanwhile, in the background, the European Commission and other institutional actors tirelessly promote (their
view of) the cause of Europe’s private law.
Instructive reports addressing an American readership are of course
nevertheless possible—and available.5 This provides me with a unique opportunity to try a different approach. My objective in this essay will be to
explore and explain why Europe has become such a fascinating legal laboratory. Messages from a laboratory should not be expected to transmit
fully elaborated, complete conceptualizations. The specific risk of such
messages is their tendency to seem both cryptic and eclectic simply because they presuppose too much background information. Their possible
benefit, however, is that they may create and enhance interest in proceedings in the laboratory, and in fact may excite study on this side of the Atlantic.

1. Since JOSEF DREXL, DIE WIRTSCHAFTLICHE SELBSTBESTIMMUNG DES VERBRAUCHERS
(1998), the most recent habilitation I am aware of was submitted by Christoph Schmid to the law faculty in Munich. CHRISTOPH SCHMID, DIE INSTRUMENTALISIERUNG DES PRIVATRECHTS DURCH DIE
EUROPÄISCHE UNION: PRIVATRECHT UND PRIVATRECHTSKOZEPTIONEN IN DER ENTWICKLUNG DER
EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATIONSVERFASSUNG (2004) (thesis on file with author). It is outstanding in the
depth of its analyses which reflect developments of postclassical private law on the one hand and the
various stages of the European integration project on the other.
2. ARTHUR S. HARTKAMP, ET AL., TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE (2nd ed. 1998); MARTIJN
W. HESSELINK, THE NEW EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE LAW IN
EUROPE (2002). English is the lingua franca of the Maastricht Journal of Comparative Law, the European Review of Private Law, The Ius Commune Lectures, and The Electronic Journal of Comparative
Law, at http://www.ejcl.org (last visited May 28, 2004).
3. See Kristina Riedl, Europäisierung des Privatrechts: Die “Recht-Fertigung”
wissenschaftlicher Vereinheitlichungsprojekte (2003) (Ph.D. thesis, European University Institute
Florence 2003) (on file with author).
4. See The Common Core of European Private Law, University of Trento,
http://www.jus.unitn.it/dsg/common-core/home.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2005).
5. See Christoph Schmid, Patterns of Legislative and Adjudicative Integration of Private Law in
Europe, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 415, 415–86 (2002).
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This article will proceed in two steps. Section I will first sketch out
how the three disciplines of European law, comparative law and private international law approach the Europeanization process. It is submitted that
none of these disciplines can effectively address the unique intricacies of
the Europeanization process by themselves. A two-step argument is presented to support this thesis. First, I will resort to an analysis of the European Union (EU) as a “multi-level system of governance” and the critique
of “methodological nationalism” in political science. Second, I will provide a preliminary reconstruction of these theorems into a more legal, albeit
transdisciplinary, language.
Section II will substantiate my skepticism as to the potential of the
three established legal disciplines to effectively orient the process of Europeanization through an analysis of three case studies. The first example is
from the field of product liability law, where the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) seems to suggest that European legislation should govern Europeanization. The second example addresses the privatization of public services—specifically the legal battle between European state aid law, a section of the European Community Treaty chapter on competition policy, and
regulatory arrangements at the national level. In characterizing this tension, I will use the term “diagonal conflict” and praise the ECJ for its sensitivity to the non-unitary character of the European polity and its “proceduralizing” approach to the resolution of tensions. The third example is
drawn from company law. Whereas the jurisprudence of the ECJ since its
famous Centros6 judgment is widely interpreted as a move towards regulatory competition, I will defend a different interpretation, arguing that the
ECJ is transforming the economic freedoms as enshrined in the European
Community Treaty7 into political rights held by European citizens. The
case studies do not reveal a new “system” of principles and rules. Rather,
they illuminate patterns of change which are at work—and in conflict—in
the Europeanization Process. Section III will take up the analytical framework introduced in the second part of Section I. It will substantiate the reconstruction of Europe’s multilevel system of governance into a framework
of legal categories. The concluding message will be that the Europeanization of private law should be conceived as a process which must find its legitimacy in the normative quality of the Europeanization process.

6. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459.
7. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 3 (1997)
[hereinafter EC TREATY].
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I. EUROPEANIZATION AS A CONTEST OF LEGAL DISCIPLINES
Three legal disciplines seem particularly close to the Europeanization
process in the realm of private law—European law, comparative law and
private international law. “Close” is a metaphor for the validity criteria and
normative perspectives of these disciplines, however they are not identical.
For that reason, the claims of these disciplines to govern and orient the Europeanization process represent a contest, akin to the “contest of faculties”
Immanuel Kant analyzed in his famous 1789 essay.8 Kant’s master discipline is not among the three candidates engaged in the contest—Kant’s
master discipline is philosophy. It is this discipline which he sought to
promote because in it reason (Vernunft) is the highest—and in fact the
only—authority. Philosophy is not among the three legal disciplines engaged in our contest. Should that imply that no discipline deserves the
championship in our contest? Not exactly. Although the allusion to Kant
is intended to signal a conceptual and normative lacunae in our discourse, I
do not wish to insinuate that we could derive from practical philosophy satisfactory answers to our queries. My contention is more modest, but still
ambitious enough. It has both an analytical and a prescriptive dimension.
My argument rests on the premise that all three disciplines are not yet conceptually in tune with the postnational constellation the Europeanization
process has generated.9
These legal disciplines are still ruled by their inherited methodological
nationalism.10 This is why they are engaging in a contest which none of
them can effectively win. In essence, they need to transform their contest
into a search for a new paradigm, and it goes without saying that the generalizing qualifications which I will employ are inadequate in that they do not

8. Immanuel Kant, The Contest of Faculties, in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS (Hans Reiss, ed.,
2nd ed. 1991).
9. Two concepts seem particularly helpful in this respect. One is Jürgen Habermas’s “postnational constellation,” introduced in an essay on the contemporary problems of democratic governance. Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation and the Future of Democracy, in JÜRGEN
HABERMAS, THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION: POLITICAL ESSAYS 58–112 (Max Pensky ed.,
2001). That term and Habermas’s normative concerns are of general importance. Constitutional democracies were institutionalized in nation states and federations. Post-national constellations are therefore
highly ambivalent—as the debates on the European Union’s democracy deficit document. In the “Editor’s Introduction” to Habermas’ essays, Max Pensky explains the term constellation as correcting the
understanding of “globalization as the end of democratization—not as its culmination but as the defining feature of the historical epoch marking the end of the national-state model for the institution of democracy”. The erosion of that model is accompanied by conflicting fears and hopes: “Finding a way to
sort them out, to confront their ambiguity squarely, and to shed some explanatory light on them—to
analyze them as challenges, rather than as overwhelming fate—is not so easy. But this is the task that
Jürgen Habermas sets for himself in The Postnational Constellation.” Id. at viii.
10. On these terms see I.D infra.
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exhaust the specter of tendencies and views in any of the fields under consideration. Comprehensive accounts are not possible, but they might also
be unnecessary. My claim, however, is that the term “methodological nationalism” is effective in that it captures and conveys the unique national
characteristics from the formative phases which have remained decidedly
influential. The validity of the argument does not depend on the current
strength of these inherited orientations. Quite to the contrary, it claims that
these traditions are eroding and is a plea for their conscious abolition.
A. European Law
My argument may sound particularly irritating in relation to the firstnamed discipline, European law. Isn’t the European project exactly about
the abolition of the nation-state as a sovereign entity? Yes and no. The answer is yes insofar as the European Community was designed as primarily
an economic project, not designed to establish a federation or an entity substituting the nation-state but rather crafted to exert a disciplining control
over the nation-state. The answer is no, however, insofar as conceptualizations of European law in general—and of European private law in particular—copy nation-state models. Both dimensions can be observed in the
legendary Van Gend en Loos11 judgment, which marks the birth of the Integration-Through-Law project:
[The EEC Treaty] is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the contracting states. . . . [T]he Community
constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which
the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields,
and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their
nationals. Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community law, therefore, not only imposes obligations on individuals, but is
also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal
12
heritage. . . .

This message has evolved into the supremacy doctrine,13 in which Community law—even secondary law—trumps national law, even constitutional law. It is, paradoxically enough, the steady deepening of European
integration which renders the orthodox understanding of legal supranationalism factually implausible and normatively unattractive.

11. Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, 1963 E.C.R. 1 [hereinafter Van Gend en Loos].
12. Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at 24.
13. See PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW 275–315 (3rd ed. 2003).
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The debate on the constitutionalization of Europe and the so-called
convention process14 mirrors these tensions. They are also visible in the
Europeanization of private law for compelling, although not necessarily
sound, reasons, as the Community effectively entered the private law arena
through a somewhat disdained backdoor—consumer protection. Consumer
protection has been both a functional need and a normative achievement
since the 1970s. Initially, the European Commission supported pertinent
research activities and the formation of a European community of consumer law advocates.15 The private law community, however, generally
responded with benign neglect for as long as practically possible. When
the growing weight of European law grew irresistibly, however, attitudes
changed profoundly. The lamenting over the patchwork character of European legislative acts characterized by early initiatives in the realm of consumer protection16 was followed by the plea for nothing less than a European codification of private law. The alliance defending this idea,
however, has been decidedly heterogeneous.17 The European Parliament is
often cited as the most committed institutional advocate of a European
code, primarily due to its resolutions of 198918 and 1994,19 which did not
have an immediate impact, but did help to keep the idea of a European code
alive.20 By now, the European Parliament has become more cautious, or at
least more patient.21

14. Which lead to the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe of July 18, 2003, European Convention, available at http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf (last
visited May 28, 2004).
15. On the history, achievements and ambitions of European consumer law see generally
NORBERT REICH & HANS W. MICKLITZ, EUROPÄISCHES VERBRAUCHERRECHT (4th ed. 2003). This
book is the latest in a long and ongoing cooperative project which started out with NORBERT REICH &
HANS W. MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN THE EC COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
(1980). Consumer law is thoroughly “Europeanized.” Its proponents not only know and cite each
other, they strive for a common cause. See e.g., STEPHEN WEATHERILL, EC CONSUMER LAW AND
POLICY (1997).
16. See among many Hein Kötz, Gemeineuropäisches Zivilrecht, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KONRAD
ZWEIGERT 481, 483 (1981); Peter Hommelhoff, Zivilrecht unter dem Einfluß europäischer
Rechtsangleichung, 192 ARCHIV FÜR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS, 71, 71–107 (1992).
17. See generally Schmid, supra note 5.
18. 1989 O.J. (C 158) 400.
19. 1994 O.J. (C 205) 518.
20. See Christian von Bar, From Principles to Codification: Prospects for European Private Law,
8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 379 (2002). Christoph Schmid, Legitimacy Conditions of a European Civil Code,
8 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 277, 277–98 (2001).
21. In Resolution A5-0384/2001, Resolution on the Approximation of Civil and Commercial Law,
dated Nov. 15, 2001, which responded to the European Commission’s Communication on European
Contract Law, COM (01) 398, the Parliament advocated the creation of a European Law Institute for
the preparation of a European Restatement.
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The agenda of the European Commission is more difficult to decipher.
The Commission’s most important and widely discussed recent initiative,
the Communication on the future of European Contract Law, published in
July 2001,22 continues to appeal, as the consumer protection directives did,
to the functional necessities of market building and the need to prevent distortions of competition caused by legal differences among Member States.
Yet the implications of this appeal are not spelled out unambiguously. On
the one hand, the Commission left the narrow confines of consumer protection and announced that it may have to look at unjust enrichment and “aspects of tort law.”23 On the other hand, it has restricted itself to four relatively limited inquiries, without explicitly revealing its own preferences.
Should Europeanization be left to market mechanisms?24 Should Europe
follow the American Restatement technique?25 Alternatively, should
Europe “consolidate” what has been accomplished so far?26 Or should
Europe embark upon wide-ranging legislative activities? The 181 responses from European institutions, governments, the business world, consumer organizations, legal practitioners and academics have been summarized by the Commission in a recent “Action Plan.”27
While the Commission prefers not to reveal its own preferences, many
of its close academic supporters—especially those in Germany and the
Netherlands—do make their desire for a European civil code project
known.28 The most prominent advocate of this idea is Christian von Bar.29
Is this a state-building project? The SGECC, the Study Group on a European Civil Code,30 emphasizes that its contribution should be neutral and
non-political—essentially an academic research project.31 German observers will recognize the continuities and hardly be surprised by the protests
against this project in France.32 Unlike the creator of the French Code
22. COM(01)398 final.
23. Communication from the Commission on European Contract Law, COM(01) 398 final, at
para. 13.
24. Id. at paras. 49–51.
25. Id. at paras. 52–56.
26. Id. at paras. 57–60.
27. A More Coherent European Contract Law—An Action Plan, COM(03)68 final.
28. ARTHUR S. HARTKAMP ET AL., supra note 2.
29. See supra note 20, at 385. For a detailed reconstruction of the origins of these ideas in the
Netherlands and Northern Germany, see Riedl, supra note 3, at 297.
30. For more information, please visit the Study Group’s website at www.sgecc.net (last visited
Sept. 1, 2004).
31. Riedl, supra note 3, at 300 and accompanying references.
32. Yves Lequette, Quelques remarques à propos du projet de code civil européen de Monsieur
von Bar, RECUEIL DALLOZ SIREY, No. 28, Jul. 25, 2002, at 2202–14; but see Bénédicte FauvarqueCosson, Faut-il un Code civil européen, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL, No. 3, at 463–80
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civil—and unlike Heidelberg’s famous Anton Justus Friedrich Thibaut
(1772–1840)—the von Bar Group33 defines codification not as a political
act, but rather places itself in the tradition of Friedrich Carl von Savigny
(1779–1861) and Bernhard Windscheid (1871–92), the mastermind in the
construction of Germany’s Burgerlichem Gesetzbuch—that “cathedral of
national glory.”34 In that tradition the codification of private law does not
require a specifically political mandate. Rather, its legitimacy stems from
scholarly deliberation which guides the process of codification. Already in
their “Joint Response” to the Commission Communication of 2001, Ole
Lando’s Contract Law Group and Christian von Bar’s Code Group have
spelled out how this vision should be implemented, namely, in four—or
five—steps.35 First, the Joint Response advocates a Restatement based
upon “an impartial formulation of principles in the light of detailed comparative research.” Second, the Joint Response suggests this Restatement
should then become “the binding foundation of all private law questions
raised by the award of contracts by public bodies.” The joint response provides three additional recommendations to arrive at what is essentially a
mandatory European Law.36 Sweet melodies?37—Familiar old melodies, at
any rate. The input and output of this process could be characterized in the
words of Horst Heinrich Jakobs in his praise of the German example, representing a code created by scholarship, a code not dominating scholarship

(2002); B. Fauvarque-Cosson, Droit européen des contrats: première réaction au plan d’action de la
Commission, RECUEIL LE DALLOZ, No. 18, at 1171–73 (2003); Ph. Malinvaud, Réponse - hors délai - à
la Commission européenne: à propos d’un code européen des contrats, RECUEIL LE DALLOZ, No. 33, at
2542–51 (2002); Jean Huet, Nous faut-il un “euro” droit civil?, RECUEIL LE DALLOZ, No. 34, at 2611–
14 (2002).
33. See Reidl, supra note 3; Von Bar, supra note 20.
34. “Dom nationaler Herrlichkeit,” cited by Reinhard Zimmermann, in HISTORISCH-KRITISCHER
KOMMENTAR ZUM BGB: BAND I: ALLGEMEINER TEIL (Matthias Schmoeckel, Joachim Rückert &
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2003).
35. Commission on European Contract Law & Study Group on a Civil Code, Communication on
European Contract Law: Joint Response of the Commission on European Contract Law and the Study
Group
on
a
European
Civil
Code
of
October
25,
2001,
at
http://www.sgecc.net/index.php?subsite=subsite_4&id=27 (last visited May 28, 2004) [hereinafter Joint
Response].
36. Joint Response, supra note 35, at paras. 62 and 69. The five steps are summarized on pages
49–50 of the Joint Response. Step 4 is optional and might seem a bit odd at first blush. It maintains
European law should be mandatory for cross border transactions. That restraint is apparently meant as a
precautionary measure against anxieties in national legal systems. A sophisticated version of this idea
was developed by Stefan Grundmann & W. Kerber, European System of Contract Laws: A Map for
Combining the Advantatges of Centralised and Decentralised Rule-making, in AN ACADEMIC GREEN
PAPER ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 295 (Stefan Grundmann & Jules Stuyck eds., 2002).
37. Reinhard Zimmermann, Heard melodies are sweet, those unheard are sweeter. . ., 193
ARCHIV FÜR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 122–69 (1993).
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but dominated by it.38 In plain English: It is the learned jurist who is best
qualified to produce the law, not the legislature and not the judge.
Neither Savigny nor Windscheid represent the full range of the German codification tradition, nor are their heirs monopolists in the debates on
the significance of codification. Among their most outspoken adversaries
is Ugo Mattei, one of the leading figures of the Trento Common Core Project.39 In his philippic Hard Code Now!,40 Mattei pleads for a code of a different quality. Mattei argues that only a civil code that fits the specific social fabric of European capitalism could counter the erosion of the social
state content of private law. A code “with deep enough foundations and
high enough vaulting,” designed to include these social values “in its conceptual edifice” is what Otto von Gierke (1841–1921), one of Bernhard
Windscheid’s most famous adversaries, had postulated.41
But do such references to old German professors make any sense? Is
the choice between the heritage of Windscheid and that of von Gierke
really on the European agenda? The call for these civil codes is not in
touch with the present state of the European Union and neither of these perspectives seem normatively attractive. These reservations will be substantiated below42 after a discussion of the two other competing disciplines:
comparative law and private international law.
B. Comparative Law
European law is often perceived as an autonomous body of law, striving for the harmonization, and often even the uniformity, of rules. Such a
perception, however, is overly simplistic and incomplete. Even European
law as enshrined in the original 1958 Treaty and the many later amendments is not uniform throughout the Union. Since the uniformity of its
meaning cannot be ensured through the adoption of a common text (as
translated in so many languages), one could argue there is no such thing as
a common European law. Summarizing some two decades of coteaching
European law with many colleagues from many European countries: What

38. “. . .[e]in Gesetzbuch, das die Quelle des Rechts nicht in sich trägt, sondern in der
Wissenschaft hat, von der es geschaffen worden ist, ein Gesetzbuch, das nicht die Wissenschaft
beherrschen will, sondern das von dieser beherrscht sein soll. . .” HORST HEINRICH JAKOBS,
WISSENSCHAFT UND GESETZGEBUNG IM BÜRGERLICHEN RECHT NACH DER RECHTSQUELLENLEHRE DES
19. JAHRHUNDERTS 160 (1983).
39. See supra note 4.
40. Ugo Mattei, Hard Code Now!, GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS, Vol. 2, No. 1, Art. 1 (2002),
available at www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/vol2/iss1/art1.
41. OTTO VON GIERKE, DIE SOZIALE AUFGABE DES PRIVATRECHTS 17 (1889).
42. See discussion in infra Section I.D and III.C.
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we have instead (and have learned to live with) are Belgium, Dutch, English, French, German, Italian, and many more versions of European law. In
essence, there are as many European laws as there are relatively autonomous legal discourses, organized mainly along national, linguistic and cultural lines. How could it be otherwise? In the core areas of private law, the
European Union has to this point affected only marginal change. Indeed,
Europe’s systems of private law are deeply entwined in the economic and
political circumstances of the polities which they order and to which they
owe their legitimacy. Comparative law is the discipline which seems best
equipped to explore and articulate these insights.43 Comparative research is
generally a cumbersome exercise and intra-European comparisons have
long been neglected because of the common interest of all Europeans to
learn about the most dynamic of all legal cultures, the United States. This
is now changing rapidly. Intra-European comparative studies are well under way.44 These activities are accompanied by rich theoretical debates. It
is not my ambition here to review, let alone evaluate, these myriad debates
and studies. I will instead point to the often quite paradoxical dimensions
of the present state of the comparative art—comparative law owes its existence to the discovery of legal diversity as established by the Westphalian
state system. Comparativists have always done both: they have underlined
the autonomy of legal systems and sought for substantive similarities and
functional equivalents.45 In both orientations they have cultivated traditions of “methodological nationalism” which are not well prepared to understand denationalization processes, the interactions between formerly
more autonomous legal systems and their links to transnational levels of
governance. “Methodological nationalism” is of surprising vitality.
An example is Pierre Legrand’s provocative and thought provoking
nonconvergence thesis.46 This thesis is directed against functionalism in
comparative law and equally against any codification initiative. Its basis is
43. Cf. Konrad Zweigert, Die Rechtsvergleichung im Dienste der europäischen
Rechtsvereinheitlichung, 16 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES
PRIVATRECHT 387 (1951).
44. Suffice it here to point again to the Common Core project, supra note 4, the ius commune lectures and casebook series; Ole Lando’s Lando group; and the new attention for integration perspectives.
Cf. Ralf Michaels, Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law in the Light of European Integration, Brüssel 26–28. Oktober2002, 1 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT (1993).
45. See David Kennedy, The Politics and Methods of Comparative Law, in THE COMMON CORE
OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: ESSAYS ON THE PROJECT 131–208 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds.,
2002).
46. Cf. Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems are not Converging, 45 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 52
(1996); Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants”, 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L.
111 (1997); Pierre Legrand, Are Civilians Educable? 18 LEGAL STUD. 216 (1998); PIERRE LEGRAND,
FRAGMENTS ON LAW-AS-CULTURE (1999).
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the epistemological assertion that common law and civil law cannot communicate. Legrand’s powerful critique of rule-oriented, rule-restricted
ideas about law and comparative research, his emphasis on the cultural
specificity of laws and his respect for the “deep structures of legal rationality”47 all seem to presuppose an autonomy which none of the individual legal systems in the EU can claim.48
Reinhard Zimmermann posits opposing views. He believes in the existence and survival of a common European legal heritage, which comprises the (non-American) common law.49 This common heritage has in his
view survived the formation of the European nation states, and thus it is by
definition transnational. Can we, and does Zimmermann himself, trust in
the vitality of this heritage? The nation-state has during its welfarist era
transformed the systems of private law thoroughly. Europeanization has
not turned the wheel of history around. It has instead reformed and modernized the regulatory frameworks of the European economy. The ius
commune had little to contribute to that transformation. Zimmermann has
joined the codification movement.50 Does this indicate that he would not
really believe in his own theses about the common legal heritage on which
the Europeanization process should build? This is not his message. What
may look like inconsistency at first glance has logic. In order to survive
and gain acceptance, Europe’s common legal heritage seems to depend
upon a helping legislative hand.51

47. Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems are not Converging, 45 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 52, 60–
61 (1996).
48. Geoffrey Samuel, Epistemology and Comparative Law: Contributions from the Sciences and
Social Sciences, in EPISTEMOLOGY AND COMPARATIVE LAW (Mark van Hoecke ed. forthcoming 2004).
49. Reinhard Zimmermann, Das Römisch-Kanonische ius commune als Grundlage europäischer
Rechtseinheit 47 JURISTENZEITUNG 8 (1992); Reinhard Zimmerman, Der europäische Charakter des
englischen Rechts—Historische Verbindungen zwischen civil law und common law, 1 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT 4 (1993); Reinhard Zimmerman, Civil Code and Civil Law: The
“Europeanization” of Private Law Within the European Community and the Re-emergence of a
European Legal Science, 1 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 63–105 (1994/95); cf., Reiner Schulze, European
Legal History—A New Field of Research in Germany, 13 J. LEGAL HIST. 270, 270–95 (1992).
50. See Reinhard Zimmermann, Roman Law and European Legal Unity, in ARTHUR S.
HARTKAMP ET AL., supra note 2, at 21.
51. Functionalism, as represented famously in the Kötz/Zweigert standard oeuvre continues to
dominate comparative research. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO
COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony Weir trans., Oxford, 3d ed., 1998); see also AXEL FLESSNER & HEIN KÖTZ ,
EUROPÄISCHES VERTRAGSRECHT (1996). Hein Kötz has always differentiated between the comparative
law perceptions of the international system and that of other disciplines. The term “multi-level governance” designates a post-national constellation which functionalism has not been prepared to address. At
the same time, Kötz was ever an outspoken skeptical critic of harmonization projects. Compare Hein
Kötz, The Trento Project and its Contribution to the Europeanization of Private Law, in THE COMMON
CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: ESSAYS ON THE PROJECT 209–19 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei
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C. Private International Law
The tensions between private international law and European law are
fascinating and they have a history of their own.52 Since European law established itself as a sui generis discipline between national public law and
international law, and the integration process did not address it for such a
long time, the masters of the new discipline did not pay it a great deal of
attention.53 The decisions in which the ECJ adjudicated private international law constellations and set aside its rules and principles without mentioning this discipline are indeed legion. Academic discoveries and encounters were bound to follow. Private international law scholars started to
recommend their discipline as the softer alternative to a harmonization of
substantive law.54 Some of them began to realize that the principle of mutual recognition adopted by the ECJ in its celebrated Cassis de Dijon decision amounted to a duty to apply foreign mandatory (public) law.55 The
Community legislators resorted to choice-of-law rules in its secondary legislation.56 Consumer lawyers saw a chance to overcome the social poverty
of private international law.57 Intensive research has been undertaken to
determine to what degree European law, especially the fundamental free-

eds., 2002). Functionalism can see equivalencies in the responses of legal systems to the problems they
have to address. It has no conceptual language for the integration process.
52. The legendary Integration-Through-Law Project initiated in the 1980s by Mauro Cappelletti,
Maria Seccombe and J.H.H. Weiler had included comparative analyses of the choice-of-law problems
in Europe’s internal market and the American federation. INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND
THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE (Cappelletti, Soccombe & Weiler eds. 1986). For a particularly
nuanced later survey compare Holger Spamann, Choice of Law in a Federal System and an Internal
Market (Jean Monnet Program Working Paper No. 8/01, 2001), available at
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/012601.html (last visited May 28, 2004).
53. Among the often cited exceptions is Walter Hallstein, Angleichung des Privat und
Prozeßrechts in der europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 28 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 211 (1964).
54. Karl F. Kreuzer, Die Europäisierung des internationalen Privatrechts - Vorgaben des Gemeinschaftsrechts, in PETER-CHRISTIAN MÜLLER-GRAFF, GEMEINSAMES PRIVATRECHT IN DER
EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT 273 (1993). Wolfgang Fikentscher, Harmonizing National and Federal European Private Laws, and a Plea for a Conflicts-of-law Approach, in THE COMMON CORE OF
EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: ESSAYS ON THE PROJECT 43–48 (Mauro Bussani & U. Mattei eds., 2002)
comes close to the positions defended in the text, especially when considering the selective scope of
European law. See discussion infra II.C on “diagonal conflicts.”
55. Case 120/78, Cassis de Dijon, 1979 E.C.R. 649; Cf. JOHANNES FETSCH, EINGRIFFSNORMEN
UND EG-VERTRAG 5, 21, 71, 126, 319 (2002).
56. For a very comprehensive survey see Fréderic Fourtoy, L’impact du droit communautaire
secondaire sur le droit international privé français (2003) (Ph.D. thesis, European University Institute
Florence 2003) (on file with author).
57. Konrad Zweigert, Zur Armut des internationalen Privatrechts an sozialen Werten, 37 RABELS
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 435 (1973).
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doms and the principle of mutual recognition, trump private international
law.58
By now, we are witnessing, particularly in Germany,59 the steady
growth of this sophisticated debate—a debate which will likely go on for
some time to come. These developments are all the more interesting since
the awareness that European law can be constructively interpreted as a conflict-of-laws discipline is gaining some ground.60 What remains apparently
difficult to accept is the message that choice-of-law methodologies can be
used in postnational constellations where they no longer refer to a comprehensive legal system, but rather organize the cooperation between different
levels of governance and resolve the tensions which result within national
systems from the selective interventions of European law.61 The message
of such analyses is no longer to recommend private international law as a
58. Wulf-Henning Roth, Der Einfluss des Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts auf das
Internationale Privatrecht, 1991 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES
PRIVATRECHT 623, 623–73; Jürgen Basedow, The Communitarization of the Conflict of Law Rules
under the Treaty of Amsterdam, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 687 (2000); Stefan Grundmann,
Binnenmarktkollisionsrecht—Vom klassischen IPR zur Integrationsordnung, 69 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT
FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 457–77 (2000).
59. But not exclusively! See Horatia Muir Watt, Choice of Law in Integrated and Interconnected
Markets: A Matter of Political Economy, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 383, 383–409 (2003).
60. See Christian Joerges, The Impact of European Integration on Private Law: Reductionist Perceptions, True Conflicts and a New Constitutional Perspective, 3 EUR. L.J. 378, 378–406 (1997);
ANDREAS FURRER, ZIVILRECHT IM GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHTLICHEN KONTEXT: DAS EUROPÄISCHE
KOLLISIONSRECHT ALS KOORDINIERUNGSINSTRUMENT FÜR DIE EINBINDUNG DES ZIVILRECHTS IN DAS
EUROPÄISCHE WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (2002); Marc Amstutz, Zwischenwelten: Zur Emergenz einer
interlegalen Rechtsmethodik im europäischen Privatrecht, in CHRISTIAN JOERGES & GUNTHER
TEUBNER, RECHTSVERFASSUNGSRECHT: RECHT-FERTIGUNG ZWISCHEN PRIVATRECHTSDOGMATIK UND
GESELLSCHAFTSTHEORIE 213 (2003); Thomas Vesting, Die Staatsrechtslehre und die Veränderung
ihres Gegenstandes:m Konsequennzen von Europäisierung und Internationalisierung, 63
VERÖFFENTLICHUNGEN DER VEREINIGUNG DER DEUTASCHEN STAATSRECHTSLEHRER 41, 65, 41–70
(2004); SCHMID, supra note 1, at 371; Gunther Teubner & Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Regime-Collision:
The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999 (2004).
61. See Christian Joerges, Economic Law, the Nation-State and the Maastricht Treaty, in EUROPE
AFTER MAASTRICHT: AN EVER CLOSER UNION? 29 (Renaud Dehousse ed., 1994) (detaching the specific mode of thought in conflict of laws from Private International Law and making it serve other areas
of law, and in particular a social theory of law, was the great project of Rudolf Wiethölter, Begriffs—
oder Interessenjurisprudenz—falsche Fronten im IPR und Wirtschaftsverfassungsrecht: Bemerkungen
zur selbstgerechten Kollisionsnorm, 1977 FESTSCHRIFT KEGEL 223 (1977). As Gunther Teubner explains, the point was no longer merely to reflect conflicts between national legal systems theoretically
and cope with them in practice, but to generalize conflict-of-laws thinking itself in such a way as to
make it yield results for conflicts between complexes of norms, areas of law and legal institutions, but
also those between social systems, indeed even for divergences between competing social theories. This
two-fold recourse to rich historical experience of private international law on the one hand and to competing theories of society on the other managed to establish “conflicts-of-laws” as the central category
for legal reconstruction of social contradictions. See Gunther Teubner, Dealing with Paradoxes of Law:
Derrida, Luhmann, Wiethölter, in ON PARADOXES AND SELF-REFERENCE IN LAW (Oren Perez & Gunther Teubner eds., 2004).
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softer alternative to harmonization or unification. It is a much more radical
quest to take the nonhierarchical, plural62 (“heterarchical”63) characteristics
of the European polity seriously. To anticipate the argument which will be
developed later64 in more detail: None of Europe’s semiautonomous political subunits are empowered with Kompetenz-Kompetenz—the power to determine one’s range of competences—which would be necessary for an authoritative resolution of jurisdictional conflicts. Equally, and even more
importantly, the type of conflicts such power has to resolve are not those
for which private international law scholars suggest their jurisdiction selection rules (Verweisungsnormen).
D. A First Outlook into International Relations Theory: The Poverty of
Methodological Nationalism in Postnational Constellations
To argue that legal disciplines like private international law and comparative law are tied in their conceptual foundations to the sovereign nation state, is like taking tea to India. Similarly, it should not come as a surprise that one can identify tendencies in the present debates toward the
building up of a federal-style of European state in the integration process or
continuities and analogies with the formation of nation-states. This is not
the gist of the argument this article seeks to develop. That argument is
more complex, more radical and more constructive. In a nutshell, there are
structural reasons for the need to loosen the ties of our discipline with the
nation-state and to replace that heritage by a different model. Europe is
neither an international organization nor a federation but can best be characterized as a multilevel system of governance sui generis, a concept
widely used among political scientists.65 I have already referred to this
analytical concept66 and will come back to it more in the third section of
this essay.67 I will use it heuristically in the following section as a background for the analysis of patterns in the Europeanization process. Only

62. As argued by Neil Walker, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, 65 MOD. L. REV. 317 (2002).
63. KARL-HEINZ LADEUR, THE THEORY OF AUTOPOIESIS. AN APPROACH TO A BETTER
UNDERSTANDING OF POST-MODERN LAW: FROM THE HIERARCHY OF NORMS TO THE HETERARCHY OF
CHANGING PATTERNS OF LEGAL INTER-RELATIONSHIPS (EUI Working Paper Law 99/3, 1999.
64. See discussion infra Sections I.D and III.A.2.
65. The term was coined by Gary Marks, Lisbeth Hooghe and Kermit Blank in their European
Integration from the 1980s: State Centric vs. Multi-level Governance, 34 J. COMMON MKT STUD. 341
(1996). Its use is by now widespread, if not inflationary. The contributions to CHRISTIAN JOERGES, ET
AL. EDS., SYMPOSIUM: MOUNTAIN OR MOLEHILL? A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE COMMISSION WHITE
PAPER ON GOVERNANCE (Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 6/01). See also infra note 174 on the adaptation of the term by European law scholars (Pernice and Furrer are cited there as examples.
66. See discussion supra in the Introductory Remarks.
67. See discussion infra III.A.
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through such analyses can one find out to what degree the model can provide instructive orientation to lawyers in their interpretation of Europeanization processes. Even more importantly, only through such concrete
analyses can one explore normative implications of the re-orientation that
the multilevel governance model suggests.
It is my ambition to develop this perspective inductively in the next
section and to resort to a series of abstract statements. Europe, so the multilevel literature suggests, is a case sui generis. This is but a truism.
Europe is inherently different from other polities. The transformations the
European nation-states have experienced are not in every respect unique,
and it is important, especially in the presentation of European developments to a non-European readership, to remain aware of the more general
features of Europeanization. Two concepts seem particularly helpful in this
respect. One is Jürgen Habermas’s “postnational constellation,” introduced
in an essay on the contemporary problems of democratic governance.68
That term and Habermas’s normative concerns are of general importance.
Constitutional democracies were institutionalized in nation-states and federations. Postnational constellations are therefore generally highly ambivalent—as the debates on the European Union’s democracy deficit document.
The second term I take from Michael Zürn69 who uses it to characterize a
dilemma and a challenge which is very similar to that of the legal disciplines addressed in this essay70—Politics and law are crucial to the effective functioning of postnational constellations, yet the concepts and theories they have inherited and learned to work with were formed within
nation-states or federations. Zürn underlines three characteristics of the
postnational constellation: (1) The nation-state is no longer autonomous in
determining political priorities but must coordinate its policies within the
68. Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation and the Future of Democracy, in JÜRGEN
HABERMAS, THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION: POLITICAL ESSAYS 58–112 (2001).
69. MICHAEL ZÜRN, THE STATE IN THE POST-NATIONAL CONSTELLATION—SOCIETAL
DENATIONALIZATION AND MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE, ARENA Working Paper No. 35/1999 (1999);
Michael Zürn, Politik in der postnationalen Konstellation, in POLITIK IN DER ENTGRENZTEN WELT 181
(Landfried ed., 2001).
70. Similarly, the sociological version of Ulrich Beck is instructive. “Methodological nationalism
takes the following premises for granted: it equates societies with nation-state societies, and sees states
and their governments as the cornerstone of social-scientific analysis.” Ulrich Beck, Toward a New
Critical Theory with a Cosmopolitan Intent, CONSTELLATIONS, 10:4, at 453 (2003). Beck distinguishes
further between methodological and normative nationalism. “In a normative sense, nationalism means
that every nation has the right to self-determination within the frame of its cultural distinctiveness.” Id.
at 454. He emphasizes the blurring of the “boundaries between political, moral and social communities.” Id. at 455. Such processes mean, so he goes on to argue, that we can no longer rely in our analyses on “national organization as a structural principle of societal and political action.” Id. at 456. Instead, we must search for and identify with a “cosmopolitan perspective”—the equivalent of a
“methodological universalism.” Passim.
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framework of international institutions; (2) national political actors must
strive for recognition beyond their national constituencies as their practices
are increasingly exposed to evaluation at international level; and (3) the nation-state retains significant resources which are indispensable for an implementation of internationally agreed-upon policies.
The scheme points to developments which do not just affect the Member States of the European Union but are of general importance—even
though they may be experienced less intensively in the United States than
in Norway, for instance. Zürn’s operationalization of the postnational constellation is particularly helpful for legal analyses because he makes us
aware of the interactions and interdependences that affect political processes and law-making process within national systems. Last but not least,
his scheme helps to overcome the famous schism between functionalist and
intergovermentalist theories of European integration because it links both
approaches in a plausible way.
E. A Preliminary Step Towards a Legal Conceptualization of the Europeanization Process
“Multilevel governance” and “methodological nationalism” are not legal concepts—we cannot rely on them as “objectively valid” restatements
of “the reality,” or “apply” them in legal conceptualizations and reasoning.
Their import into the world of law requires their reconstruction in the introduction of normative dimensions into analytical concepts. Zürn’s critique of methodological nationalism is a step in that direction because Zürn
pleads for a new orientation for both politics and policymaking. What I
suggest is a step towards a reconstruction of the legal dimension of the
European polity—to start with a suggestion submitted some time ago.71
The national systems of private law have all found responses to the tensions between economic efficiency, functional necessities and the normative commitments of welfare states—and the legitimacy of these responses
is generally unquestioned. European integration exposes these systems to
new exigencies, namely that of market integration which was the main objective of the European Economic Community and was both an indispensable prerequisite and a crucial element of Europe’s harmonization policies.
Europeanization as a process can therefore be characterized by a fundamental tension: The European project of market integration started to im-

71. See Christian Joerges & Gert Brüggemeier, Europäisierung des Vertrags und Haftungsrechts,
in GEMEINSAMES PRIVATRECHT IN DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT (Peter-Christian Müller-Graff
ed., 1993). See also IRENE KLAUER, DIE EUROPÄISIERUNG DES PRIVATRECHTS—DER EUGH ALS
ZIVILRICHTER (1998); SCHMID, supra note 1, at 362.
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pose its functionalist logic on the private law systems of the Member
States, their various legal traditions, and visions of private law justice. The
tension could neither be resolved by the replacement of European law by a
supranational equivalent of nation-state law; nor can national law be replaced by European exercises in market building. Such exercises may result in disintegrative effects—or trigger innovative developments within
national systems. Such risks and potentials are explored in the following
section. This analysis remains a useful starting point, however, it must be
refined mainly because the integration project has continuously widened in
scope. It has increasingly affected national systems, which in turn have
learned to develop more sophisticated responses to these external legal
stimuli. The brief references to these two non-legal categories—
“multilevel governance” and “methodological nationalism”—suffice to
substantiate this observation a step further: It follows from the characterization of the European Union as a multilevel system of governance and from
the disaggregation of formerly integrated national competences that the
tensions between the functionalist logic of integration and the normative
logic inherent in national legal systems cannot be resolved by the building
up of a hierarchy within which a “higher” European level could exert comprehensive control over national law. That is a complex formula for a clear
message and a compelling logic: The European Union is no unitary state
and no federation. It is composed of semiautonomous units, which have
become interdependent. These units are not subject to comprehensive supranational authority. The common interest in, and commitments to, the
building up of a functioning market has continuously to be balanced with
the normative preferences legitimized in the national legal systems. It further follows from the “heterarchical” nature of the European Union that we
cannot expect its law to achieve the same type and the same degree of coherence we seek to achieve in the legal systems of unitary polities.
II. THE PRACTICE OF EUROPEANIZATION:
THREE EXEMPLARY PATTERNS
Europeanization cannot be expected to reproduce a system of private
law equivalent in its comprehensiveness and consistency to that of the Continental civil code systems. What else will emerge out of the interaction
and tensions between the functionalist logic of market integration and the
normative logic of preference formation in national legal systems? This
question has an empirical and a normative dimension, and both are contested. As a first approximation to the state of the debate on the objectives
of Europeanization and of the best means to achieve them, we can look
again at the contest of legal disciplines and read their disciplinary ap-
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proaches as both a description of the Europeanization process and a cure to
the failures they perceive. We then become aware that their contest is
linked to an ancillary agenda, namely a contest over the structuring of the
emerging European polity which takes place between—but also within—
the individual disciplines. To rephrase the perceptions and positions already mentioned:
1. Europeanization is about to destroy the systematic coherence of
private law. This is a widely shared concern, particularly in Germany.72 One cure to that problem is to replace national laws with
a European law more systematically, i.e., to proceed from the
limited interventions characteristic of Europeanization thus far,
to a more comprehensive European code.73 An alternative here
would be to reduce European legislative activities, defend national legal cultures and organize cooperation via private international law.74
2. Europeanization, like globalization, fosters deregulation, privatization and regulatory competition, an assessment that can lead to
two competing conclusions. While (some) proponents of the
“European social model” seek to defend the social dimensions of
private law with the help of a European code,75 proponents of
economic efficiency argue that Europeanization has the potential
of modernizing and rationalizing European private law, not just
because it values individual freedoms so highly, but because the
exercise of these freedoms will trigger processes of regulatory
competition.76
Whose perception is correct? Which normative options are open? Which
perception deserves support? It seems worth noting at the outset that
“methodological nationalism” requires orchestrating the concert of voices

72. See supra note 16.
73. See supra notes 18 and 19.
74. See supra note 54.
75. See UGO MATTEI, THE EUROPEAN CODIFICATION PROCESS—CUT AND PASTE 107–28 (2003);
Ugo Mattei, Hard Code Now!, GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS, Vol. 2: No. 1 (2002), available at
www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/vol2/iss1/art1 (last visited Sept.1, 2004).
76. Out of a steady growing body of literature see Simon Deakin, Two Types of Regulatory Competition: Competitive Federalism versus Reflexive Harmonisation: A Law and Economics Perspective
on Centros, 2 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. L. 231 (1999); EVA-MARIA KIENINGER, WETTBEWERB DER
PRIVATRECHTSORDNUNGEN (2003); Jan Smits, How to predict the differences in uniformity between
different areas of a future European private law? An evolutionary approach, in THE ECONOMICS OF
HARMONIZING EUROPEAN LAW 50–70 (Alain Marciano & Lean-Michel Josselin eds., 2002); Gerhard
Wagner, The Economics of Harmonisation: The Case of Contract Law, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 995
(2002).
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just described—and it might be that the Europeanization process is not
adequately represented by any of these voices.
How can one determine whether this is so? There is certainly no way
to describe the Europeanization process comprehensively. What seems
possible and instructive, however, is to explore patterns of this process to
which we can ascribe exemplary importance. This is indeed the thrust of
the following case studies. Each relates to a distinct link between European
law and national law. The first example from the field of product liability
law concerns a field in which the European legislature has been active,
providing an excellent example of an encounter between European (supranational) and national private law. The second example is drawn from the
field of company law and concerns the impact of European primary law on
national legal systems. The third example addresses the tensions between
European policies in the field privatization of public services and national
distributive policies, more technically speaking between European state aid
law, a section of the Treaty chapter on competition policy, and regulatory
arrangements at the national level. The exemplary quality of these three
types of conflicts seems obvious, however, one must be cautious when
evaluating the results reached in each of the cases—while the language of
European law is seemingly compelling doctrinal logic, its messages are
much more indeterminate and ambivalent.
A. Product Liability Law: The Poverty of Orthodox Supranationalism
Consumer protection used to be perceived as the flagship of Europeanization. The European Community, so often described and criticized as
building up its common market through strategies of “negative” integration
(the abolition of legal provisions impeding free trade) entered the field of
private law through the promotion of a “social” private law, promoting a
field unknown or marginal in some states, of dubious reputation in others.
The frontlines seemed clear: On the one side, the European Community,
promoting directives on consumer protection,77 unfortunately constrained
by the unanimity rule of Article 100, but advised and encouraged by a
transnational epistemic community of consumer law advocates; on the
other side, the defenders of the unity or normative coherence of the national
private law system, complaining about such interventions, questioning the
Community’s competence78 and questioning the validity of the argument
77. The author, promoter and defender of the directive, however, was prudent enough to downplay
the consumer protection objective. Cf. Hans C. Taschner, Die künftige Produzntenhaftung in
Deutschland, 39 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 611 (1986).
78. See with regard to the product liability directive, Bodo Börner, Die Produkthaftung oder das
vergessene Gemeinschaftsrecht, in EUROPÄEISCHE GERICHTSBARKEIT UND NATIONALE
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that uniform rules of consumer protection would enhance the quality of
competitive processes.
1. The ECJ Judgments of April 25, 2002 on the Product Liability
Directive. The Directive 85/374/EEC79 on Product Liability was widely
considered to be a piece of legislation with many defects. It harmonized
only a small segment of product liability law.80 Its standard of consumer
protection seemed generally unimpressive.81 Critics, skeptics and defenders agreed, however, as to its efficacy, tending to characterize it as quite
marginal legislation that would neither do much good nor much harm. This
conclusion seemed to be well-founded in view of Article 13 which provided that the Directive did “not preclude the application of other systems
of contractual or non-contractual liability based on other grounds, such as
fault or a warranty in respect of latent defects” and hence did not affect national tort law.82 It was also understood that consumer protection provisions should be viewed as minimum standards which would not preempt
the adoption of more stringent rules by national legislatures.83
These views were well established from 1985 until, to the surprise of
most observers, the ECJ, in three judgments handed down on April 25,
2002,84 assigned a new importance to what had been to that point a dormant
directive through a doctrinally bold move—in the Court’s view, the Community legislature had not merely laid down minimum standards, but instead aimed at a “complete harmonization” of its provisions on the compensation of consumers. The term “complete harmonization” is an element
of the supremacy doctrine. That doctrine would be weakened substantially

VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT: FESTSCHRIFT ZUM 70: GEBURTSTAG VON HANS KUTSCHER 43
(1981).
79. Council Directive 85/374/EEC, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29.
80. Cf. H. Koch, Internationale Produkthaftung uznd Grenzen der Rechtsangleichung durch die
EG-Richtlinie, 152 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE HANDSELS UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 537 (1988).
81. Cf. Gert Brüggemeier & Norbert Reich, Die EG-Produkthftungsrichtlinie 1985 und ihr
Verhältnis zur Produzentenhaftung nach Paragraph 823 Abs. 1 BGB, WERTPAPIER MITTEILUNGEN 149
(1986).
82. Gert Brüggemeier, Produkthaftung und Produktsicherheit, 152 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS
GESAMTE HANDELS UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 511, 531 (1988).
83. Had the Directive been adopted after the Single European Act and accordingly based on Article 100(a) (now 95), then the adoption of more stringent standards (subject to the procedure laid down
in Sections 4 and 5 of that provision) would have been possible. The Advocate General Geelhoed was
able to bring the orthodox understanding of supremacy and pre-emption to bear. See his Conclusions in
Case C-154/00, para. 4; Case C-52/00, para. 14 and Case C-183/00, para. 27. The ECJ followed suit.
See Case C-154/00, para. 10; Case C-52/00, para. 14, Case C- 183/00.
84. Case C-52/00, Commission v. France, 2002 E.C.R. I-3827; Case C-183/00, María Victoria
González Sánchez v. Medicina Asturiana SA, 2002 E.C.R. I-3901; Case C-154/00, Commission v.
Greece, 2002 E.C.R. I-3879.
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if national law could adopt provisions deviating from primary European
law (Treaty provisions) or from secondary law (acts adopted in the Community legislative process). The doctrine of preemption is a quasilogical
implication—where the Community legislature has “occupied” a field, the
Member States can no longer pursue deviating policies.
The views on the limited reach of the Product Liability Directive were
not just shared by advocates of consumer protection. The most important
reason militating in favor of a narrow interpretation stems from the dynamics of general tort law and the interdependencies of product liability in tort
law with contract law and product safety law. The ECJ would only very
occasionally have an opportunity to develop its views on the Directive. It
seemed reasonable to conclude that an ossification of the whole field might
follow from any extensive interpretation of the effects of the directive on
national law. 85
Indeed, such fears seem cogent in light of the ECJ’s three new products liability judgments. The decision concerning Spanish law86 seems particularly troubling.87 In Medicina Asturiana SA, Maria Sanchez, the plaintiff, required a blood transfusion in the hospital run by the defendant
institution. As a consequence of the transfusion, she was infected with the
Hepatitis C virus. She based her action on the law by which Spain had
transposed the Directive into Spanish law and, in addition, on the general
liability provisions of Spanish civil law and on the Spanish General Law
for the Protection of Consumers and Users of July 19, 1984, under which
the claimant had only to prove damage and a causal connection. Under the
Product Liability Directive, implemented ten years after the 1984 Law,88
she also had to prove that the hospital had produced the blood conserves at
issue, which she failed to show. Therefore, the success of her claim depended on the relationship between the three legal bases. Article 13 of the
Directive provides that the Directive “shall not affect any rights which an
injured person may have according to the rules of the law of contractual or
non-contractual liability or a special liability system existing at the moment

85. Brüggemeier, supra note 82, at 531.
86. C-183/00, María Victoria González Sánchez v. Medicina Asturiana SA, 2002 E.C.R. I-03901;
Marie-Eve Arbour, Compensation for Damage Caused by Defective Drugs: European Private Law between Safety Requirements and Free-Market Values, 10 EUR. L.J. 87 (2004); Schmid, supra note 5, especially Part 2, Section 4, Ch. 5.
87. The two parallel decisions concerned the conformity of transpositions going beyond its standards of protection with the Directive: Greece had wanted to spare its citizens from the personal contribution of €500 provided for in Article 9 I (b) of the Directive. Case C-183/00, para. 8. France wanted
to hold the distributor liable alongside the manufacturer, and, additionally, to restrict the exemptions
from liability foreseen in Article 7 of the Directive. Case C-52/00, para. 6.
88. Case C-183/00, Medicina Asturiana SA, 2002 E.C.R. I-3901, at paras. 7, 8.
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when this Directive is notified.” Does this mean, the Spanish court asked
the ECJ, that the Directive could “be interpreted as precluding the restriction or limitation, as a result of transposition of the Directive, of rights
granted to consumers under the legislation of the Member State?”89 To the
unversed reader, the question may sound rhetorical. But the Court responded:
“[. . .]Article 13 of the Directive cannot be interpreted as giving the
Member States the possibility of maintaining a general system of product
90
liability different from that provided for in the Directive.” . . . The provision that Article 13 does not affect claims on a different basis cannot
“be relied on in such a case in order to justify the maintenance in force of
national provisions affording greater protection than those of the Direc91
tive”.

In its analysis of the Community law provisions, the ECJ refers to Recital 1 in the preamble of the Directive, according to which “approximation
is necessary because legislative divergences may distort competition and
affect the movement of goods within the common market and entail a differing degree of protection of the consumer against damage caused by a defective product to his health or property.”92 It had been necessary at the
time to introduce this sentence, in order to “establish” the Community’s
(functional) legislative competence. Since then, the paragraph has become
neither more empirically relevant, nor normatively more correct. Nevertheless, the Court’s judgment reaffirmed its value as a virtually teleological
motivation for restricting Member States’ legislative autonomy.93
2. Critique. The style of reasoning of the ECJ is often formalistic
for many reasons, among them the precarious legitimacy of the Court. Is
formalism a plausible strategy and normatively sound response to queries
as to the Court’s legitimacy? Should the commentators of the Court seek to
protect it by submitting restrictive interpretations of the judgment? The
annotations to the judgment are in disagreement. A German commentator,
in a very comprehensive and careful analysis,94 suggests that the ECJ’s intrusion into product liability law should be read as preempting not just national transformations of the Directive, but also tort law more generally.

89. Id. at para. 13.
90. Id. at para. 30.
91. Id. at para. 33.
92. Id. at para. 3.
93. Id. at paras. 24, 25.
94. Renate Schaub, Abschied vom nationalen Produkthaftungsrecht? Anspruch und Wirklichkeit
der EG-Produkthaftung—Zugleich Besprechung der Urteile des EuGH vom 25. 4. 2002, Rs. C-52/00,
C-154/00 und C-183/00, in 2003 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT III 541-589 (2003).
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While the doctrinal or conceptual basis of European strict liability is not
clear, what is clear is the ECJ’s harmonization objective. As a result, national courts must now turn to the ECJ and submit questions of tort law to
it. This can be argued under the acte claire and supremacy doctrine. According to this tandem, national courts must ask the ECJ for clarification
wherever the meaning of European concepts seem ambiguous. In this way
the system seeks to ensure the uniformity of law in Europe. “What a civil
law fantasy!” common law lawyers may tend to think. Or perhaps they
would characterize this as a pure nightmare? If these doctrines were applied extensively, they could potentially increase the burden of the ECJ
enormously. This would imply that the Court would get increasingly involved in the adjudication of issues which it is not well prepared and
equipped to address. Indeed, the majority of the annotations to the ECJ’s
intrusion into product liability law criticize the court for not exercising
more restraint.95
It seems absolutely unlikely that national courts will abstain from developing their product liability law further and impose upon the litigating
parties the burdens and references to the Directive that the ECJ judgments
apparently require. At the same time, it seems equally implausible that the
ECJ will pursue a strategy of expanding its reach to include ever more responsibilities—especially responsibilities over such a complex and contested area. Given that the Product Liability Directive is based upon now
outdated Treaty provisions, the chances for a more prudent exercise of judicial powers seems likely, although such comments cannot explain, let
alone justify, the Court’s revival of the language of orthodox supranationalism.
B. Company Law: The Transformation of Economic Freedoms into Political Rights
The ECJ’s Centros judgment96 is to be regarded as its most important—and certainly its most debated—holding since the legendary Cassis
de Dijon decision of 1979.97 Expectations of the subsequent Überseering98
95. G. Viney, L’Interprétation par la CJCE de la Directive du 25 Juillet 1985 sur la Responsbilité
du Fait des Produits Défectueux, LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE, 2002, I 177, No. 44-45, 1945-1948 (2002);
Jean Calais-Auloy, Menace européene sur la jurisprudence francaise concernant l’obligation de
sécurité du vendeur professionel, RECUEIL LE DALLOZ, No. 31, at 1458 (2002); A. Palmieri & R.
Pardolesi, Difetti del prodotto e del diritto privato europeo, IL FORO ITALIANO, 125, IV, at 296 (2002).
See also Marie-Eve Arbour, supra note 86, and Schmid, supra note 5.
96. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459.
97. Case C-120/78, Cassis de Dijon , 1979 E.C.R. 649.
98. Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH
(NCC), 2002 E.C.R. I-9919.
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and, soon thereafter, Inspire Art99 judgments were correspondingly tense.
So much has been written about these judgments100 that any comprehensive
presentation of the debate could easily fill a book. The purpose, however,
for which this recent jurisprudence will be analyzed in this essay is both
limited and specific. Its focus is an analysis of the law-generating process,
in which individuals and companies exercising their economic freedoms
under national and European legislation, and both national and European
courts, participate and interact. This analysis will defend three theses: (1)
The ECJ’s company law case law has effectively transformed economic
freedoms into the rights of political participation; (2) the ECJ’s jurisprudence is not exposing company law to the logic of economic processes but
rather strives towards a “juridification” of regulatory competition; and (3)
the theoretical and practical challenge of these law-generating processes
stems from their “constitutional” importance. A constitutionalization of the
European Union, which seeks to ensure the legitimacy of its law production
must turn its attention to the quality of these processes.
1. Centros. The judgment in Centros concerns the core of all the
European legal rules and principles (the famous acquis communautaire),
namely, the freedoms of market citizens, which apply directly and ought,
therefore, to take primacy over national law. Moreover, the decision
counts as an extension and strengthening of a perception that has deeply
penetrated the legal consciousness and awareness of economic law as it is
held to serve so-called negative integration, because the directly applicable
freedoms can be invoked by European citizens when asking for review of
the content of national law by the ECJ. Through such reviews, national
laws can be exposed to “regulatory competition.” These perceptions of
Centros have their fundamentum in re, but they neglect important dimensions.
As so often occurs, the facts of this cause célèbre were quite trivial.101
A Danish married couple, Marianne and Tony Bryde, wished to import
wine into Denmark but hoped to save the fee of DK200,000 (approximately
€28,000) that Denmark requires for the registration of companies. They
99. Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd.,
2003 E.C.R. I-10155.
100. A Celex search on March 25, 2002 indicated 112 commentaries. That figure was too modest,
for it did not take into account, for instance, HARALD HALBHUBER, LIMITED COMPANY STATT GMBH?
EUROPARECHTLICHER RAHMEN UND DEUTSCHER WIDERSTAND—EIN BEITRAG ZUR AUSLEGUNG VON
ART. 48 EG UND ZUM EUROPÄISCHEN GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT (2001).
101. The following owes much to BARBARA TREFIL, CENTROS UND DIE NIEDERLASSUNGSFREIHEIT
VON GESELLSCHAFTEN IN EUROPA (European University Institute Working Paper Law No. 2003/9),
available at http://www.iue.it/PUB/law03-9.pdf (last visited May 38, 2004).
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founded a private limited company in the United Kingdom in May of 1992
with a “seat” at the home of English friends—the now legendary Centros
Ltd.—and set up a subsidiary in Copenhagen. None of these steps required
the capital investment they would have required in their home state of
Denmark.102
The Danish authorities refused registration, arguing that the only reason why the Brydes had sought the help of their friends in the United
Kingdom was to avoid the burdens of Danish law. The Brydes went to
court. Their complaint went through all official channels until it reached
the highest possible judicial authority, Denmark’s Højesteret.103 The
Højesteret submitted the question of whether the refusal of registration was
compatible with the guarantee of freedom of establishment to the ECJ in
early June 1997. The ECJ’s decision of March 9, 1999 read:
It is contrary to Articles 52 and 58 of the Treaty for a Member State to
refuse to register a branch of a company formed in accordance with the
law of another Member State in which it has its registered office but in
which it conducts no business where the branch is intended to enable the
company in question to carry on its entire business in the state in which
that branch is to be created, while avoiding the need to form a company
there, thus evading application of the rules governing the formation of
companies which, in that state, are more restrictive as regards the paying
104
up of a minimum share capital.

2. Discussion. The ECJ decision was read by some105 as cautiously
continuing its earlier interpretations of freedom of establishment.106 Others
102. Their conduct is interpreted with this degree of severity by Germany’s maître penseur of private international law, Gerhard Kegel in an editorial in Europäisches Wirtschafts und Steuerrecht, Heft
8, 1999. Gerhard Kegel, Es ist was faul im Staate Dänemark… (There is Something Rotten in the State
of Denmark), EUROPÄISCHES WIRTSCHAFTS UND STEUERRECHT HEFT, Sept. 8, 1999, editorial.
103. Case C-212/97, para. 13: “Is it compatible with Article 52 of the EC Treaty, in conjunction
with Articles 56 and 58 thereof, to refuse registration of a branch of a company which has its registered
office in another Member State and has been lawfully founded with company capital of GBP 100 (approximately DKK 1 000) and exists in conformity with the legislation of that Member State, where the
company does not itself carry on any business but it is desired to set up the branch in order to carry on
the entire business in the country in which the branch is established, and where, instead of incorporating
a company in the latter Member State, that procedure must be regarded as having been employed in
order to avoid paying up company capital of not less than DKK 200 000 (at present DKR 125 000)?”
104. Sentence 1 of the tenor of the Judgment, 1999 E.C.R. I- 1947.
105. Completeness can scarcely be achieved by portraying the range of opinions. For a specific
discussion of the response in Germany, see Harald Halbhuber, National Doctrinal Structures and European Company Law, 38 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1385 (2001). A very comprehensive survey on the
overall development of company law from an outsider’s perspective is offered by Jan Wouters, European Company Law: Quo Vadis?, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 257 (2000). For a more topical discussion, see TREFIL, supra note 101.
106. Case C-79/85, Segers v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor Bank- en Verzekeringswesen,
Groothandel en Vrije Beroepen, 1986 E.C.R. 2375.
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maintained that the ECJ was radicalizing its jurisprudence in a questionable
fashion.107 Substantial energies were spent on the reconstruction of the
case in the terms of a discipline the ECJ tends to neglect persistently—did
“incorporation theory” (Gründungstheorie)108 trump the “company seat
principle” (Sitztheorie)109 with the help of the ECJ,110 or did the judgment
respect diversity in the European Union at the expense of the proper
choice-of-law principle? Had not the ECJ just confirmed its respect for
private international law in general and the seat in particular in its Daily
Mail111 decision?112 A considerable number of commentators saw the ECJ
as opening the road to regulatory competition, suggesting the potential for
Delaware effects in Europe—anathema to adherents of the seat theory.113
Does it make sense to interpret the reasoning of the ECJ in the light of
a discipline the court does not consider? The answer to that question depends upon the problem and the context of the problem the Court seeks to
resolve. Could a decision on the merits of the two competing theories be a
constructive contribution to the Europeanization of company law? That
field is characterized by endless efforts to harmonize statutory law, to live

107. Ernst Steindorff, Centros und das Recht auf die günstigste Rechtsordnung, 1999
JURISTENZEITUNG 1140.
108. According to the law of all common law and some continental jurisdictions, the corporate law
governing the internal affairs of a given corporation is the law of the place of incorporation
(Gründung)—a very convenient doctrine for an expansionist economy like that of imperial England,
comment the critics.
109. According to the theory traditionally dominating the (European) Continent, the effective seat
doctrine—“Sitz” or “siège reel”—the internal affairs of a corporation are to be governed by the national
law of the state where its effective seat is located. This doctrine is based on the assumption the seat
jurisdiction has the most contact with the business of the company and should protect the what is regarded there as a public interest.
110. See, e.g., Peter Behrens, Das Internationale Gesellschaftsrecht nach dem Centros-Urteil des
EuGH, 19 PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS 323 (1999). This was the
question the Federal High Court submitted to the ECJ on May 25, 2000 in the Uberseering decision.
See discussion infra II.B.3.
111. Case C-81/87, The Queen/Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily
Mail and General Trust PLC, 1988 E.C.R. 5483. At stake in this case was the compatibility with European law of an English tax law requiring the consent of the Treasury before a resident corporation could
move its headquarters out of the country. This served precisely the purpose to tax gains that had accrued while the company was a resident of the UK.
112. See, e.g., Werner Ebke, Das Schicksal der Sitztheorie nach dem Centros-Urteil des EuGH,
1999 JURISTENZEITUNG 656; Peter Kindler, Niederlassungsfreiheit für Scheinauslandsgesellschaften?
Die Centros-Entscheidung des EuGH und das inernationale Privatrecht, 52 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT 1993 (1999); Wulf-Henning Roth, Case Note, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 147 (2000).
113. The “Delaware effect” denotes the move of companies into the legal regime most convenient
to them, the (in)famous “race to the bottom.” It was especially paragraph 20 in Advocate General La
Pergola’s opinion that inspired this sort of interpretation. See Matthias Baudisch, From Status to Contract? An American Perspective on Recent Developments in European Company Law, in THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND GOVERNANCE 24, 44 (Francis Snyder ed., 2003).
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with German sensitivities over their codetermination legislation and to enable economic actors to do business in an integrating market. Would it be a
constructive contribution of the ECJ to confirm that the believers in incorporation theory should proceed with their principle while the defenders of
the seat theory should continue to insist on the application of the laws of
the “real seat” of a company? I cannot see why the ECJ should have
thought along such lines. The manner in which the ECJ considered the
conduct of the Bryde couple in Centros seems to be focused instead on
what it means to be a Dane and a European citizen: European law, proffers
the criticism of the ECJ’s decision, has no business interfering with a
purely internal Danish matter and the Brydes, who were pursuing no business interests in England, ought to have bowed to their home sovereign.
But are the Brydes only Danes? The ECJ does not think so, stressing there
is nothing in itself abusive when a citizen of a Member State founds a
company in accordance with the laws of another Member State’s provisions which are more favorable for him. According to the ECJ, this is
simply a matter of right:
That being so, the fact that a national of a Member State who wishes to
set up a company chooses to form it in the Member State whose rules of
company law seem to him the least restrictive and to set up branches in
other Member States cannot, in itself, constitute an abuse of the right of
establishment. The right to form a company in accordance with the law
of a Member State and to set up branches in other Member States is inherent in the exercise, in a single market, of the freedom of establishment
114
guaranteed by the Treaty.

As Ernst Steindorff has critically observed, this argument seems to be establishing, a “right to the most favourable legal system.”115 If this were so,
the ECJ could indeed be interpreted as pursuing a strategy of “negative” integration, of exposing national legislatures to a regulatory competition orchestrated by private actors or of sending Europe on the road to Delaware.
But the ECJ’s message is more complex—it did not question in principle
the competence of Denmark to impose regulatory requirements on both its
own and foreign citizens and companies. Indeed, this argument expressly
confirmed that “a Member State is entitled to take measures designed to
prevent certain of its nationals from attempting, under cover of the rights
created by the Treaty, improperly to circumvent their national legislation or
to prevent individuals from improperly or fraudulently taking advantage of
provisions of Community law.”116
114. Case C-212/97, Centros, 1999 E.C.R. at para. 27.
115. Steindorff, supra note 107.
116. According to Case C-212/97, Centros: “[A]ccording to the Court’s case-law, national measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the
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Yet the Court insisted that such regulatory restrictions be based on
good grounds of public interest. European law does not push Danish law
aside, but rather places it under pressures of justification. It was this pressure that Denmark could not stand up to—it could not explain how its
statutory requirements would achieve the protection of creditors which
was, according to the Danish government’s presentation, their very objective. In essence, the ECJ acted as a constitutional court in the Centros case
in that it assumed the right to test Danish law according to whether it respected rights guaranteed at the European level. Even so, the constraints
imposed on Denmark’s sovereignty were limited, and Denmark soon made
use of its retained autonomy by adopting a new regulation requiring that
companies that wish to do business in Denmark and who maintain their
main administrative center there, either deposit DK110,000 with the Danish
bank authorities in the form of cash, government bonds or bank guarantees
(which in the event of insolvency serve exclusively to meet tax demands),
or provide proof that minimum assets of at least DK125,000 are available.117
Have the Danes simply put new gloss on the old provisions? Some
Danish commentators think so.118 In its judgment of February 3, 2002, the
Danish Supreme Court was silent on the issue of Centros’ tax liability; it
simply reprimanded that the forms had not been completed correctly.119
What, then, is so “rotten”—in the state of Denmark and elsewhere?120
Treaty must fulfil four conditions: they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they must be
justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to
attain it . . . .” Id. at para. 34. “Those conditions are not fulfilled in the case in the main proceedings.
First, the practice in question is not such as to attain the objective of protecting creditors which it purports to pursue since, if the company concerned had conducted business in the United Kingdom, its
branch would have been registered in Denmark, even though Danish creditors might have been equally
exposed to risk.” Id. at para. 35. “Since the company concerned in the main proceedings holds itself
out as a company governed by the law of England and Wales and not as a company governed by Danish
law, its creditors are on notice that it is covered by laws different from those which govern the formation of private limited companies in Denmark and they can refer to certain rules of Community law
which protect them, such as the Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 based on Article
54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the annual accounts of certain types of companies . . . , and the Eleventh
Council Directive 89/666/EEC of 21 December 1989 concerning disclosure requirements in respect of
branches opened in a Member State by certain types of company governed by the law of another
State . . . .” Id. at para. 36 (citations omitted).
117. See TREFIL, supra note 101, at 31 (referencing www.retsinfo.dk and a survey of the debate on
the questionability in European law of the new regulations).
118. F. Hansen, From C 212 to L 212—Centros Revisited, 2 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 141, 156
(2001) (citing “a flagrant violation of Article 43 EU”).
119. Ugeskrift for Retsvæn 2002.1079H; Laurits Christensen (Copenhagen) and Hanne B. Jensen
(Florence) kindly pointed me to the judgment.
120. Kegel, supra note 102.
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Denmark has to justify itself before its own citizens in the forum of the
ECJ. It is entitled to pursue its regulatory interests, but it also must show
that the means that it chooses serve the ends that it pursues. It must not
discriminate against foreign citizens and its law should be as Communityfriendly as possible.
What legal discipline are we dealing with here? Clearly we are no
longer in the realm of private international law. Comparative studies on the
company law traditions of the EU Member States are certainly instructive,
but they do not reveal much about the proper design of company law in a
multilevel system of governance. Is the Court building a European body of
company law which would conceivably replace national laws—essentially
a European company code? What we are witnessing is a process of law
production which deals with contested regulatory objectives and the tensions of national and supranational competencies. Europeanization occurs
through a European “conflict of laws” which must cope with legal differences, in an effort to define and maintain Denmark’s political autonomy
while at the same time protecting rights that European law is granting to all
Europeans. How else than through the shaping of procedures in which responses are required could this be accomplished? Centros is dealing only
with segments of company law production, namely the freedom of establishment and it effectively proceduralizes this right. The Brydes have not
acquired the “right” to replace Danish law by some other law that they find
more pleasant. Rather, they have the right to initiate a process in which
Denmark must justify its regulatory measures. It is precisely this reshaping
of economic freedoms as rights to political participation where the constitutional core of the decision lies. This interaction is novel in that it bridges
different levels of governance, yet it seems more familiar when contrasted
with the interaction of private rights and the political sphere in constitutional democracies. Private autonomy and political rights, so Jürgen
Habermas has continually argued since his seminal Between Facts and
Norms,121 must be conceived as two co-original positions.122 What does
this mean in the European context? According to the Centros judgment, it
means that a Danish citizen can bring his sovereign to court with the argument that the latter lacks justification for denying him the exercise of his
rights in accordance with the regulatory schemes approved by other Member States.

121. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 82, 133 (1998).
122. Cf. his recent restatement in Jürgen Habermas, Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?, 29 POL. THEORY 766, 766–81. See also Jürgen Habermas, Why
Europe needs a Constitution?, in ERIK O. ERIKSEN ET AL., DEVELOPING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE
19 (2004), also available at http://www.iue.it/RSC/EU/Reform02(uk).pdf (last visited May 28, 2004).
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3. Überseering and Inspire Art. Centros produced dramatic effects
at two levels. It was foreseeable that interested actors would test the
strength of their legal positions to explore possibilities to save capital by
establishing businesses in the United Kingdom, although little systematic
sociological research has been undertaken so far to ascertain the true effect.123 The debate in Centros concerned the interpretation of the new legal
situation and the discussion of the next steps the ECJ would take. These
steps were illuminating—and they may initiate a less doctrinal but more
constructive turn in the Europeanization debate.
In a decision of March 30, 2000124 the German Federal High Court
submitted the question to the ECJ of whether German law is incompatible
with the EC Treaty if it prevents a Dutch company from pursuing its claims
against a German defendant in a German court. This is a possible procedural implication of Germany’s seat theory. According to Section 50(1) of
the German Civil Procedures Act (Zivilprozessordnung), locus standi of
companies in German courts is dependant upon their competence to act legally (Rechtsfähigkeit). In the present case, the plaintiff Überseering had
moved the center of its activities from the Netherlands to Germany. The
plaintiff sought to bring an action against the defendant, a German company, which sought compensation for defective work carried out by the
company. Because a company incorporated according to Dutch law could
essentially lose its legal capacity once it transferred its “seat” (Verwaltungssitz), such a company was essentially forced to reregister in Germany.125 In an internal market, such legal principles seem downright incredible.
German law is not quite that rigid, however. As Advocate General
Colomer noted in his opinion, the German government had argued in the
oral hearings that a company in the plaintiff’s position could, in fact, continue to assert its rights under German law,126 and that, in German law,
Überseering’s passive locus standi continued to exist despite the new

123. Matthias Baudisch argues that firms will not so easily risk their reputation by engaging in a
“race to the bottom” in an analysis that is not sociological but nonetheless extremely informative. Matthias Baudisch, From Status to Contract? An American Perspective on Recent Developments in European Company Law, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND GOVERNANCE, 24, 44 (Francis Snyder ed., 2003).
See also Catherine Holst, European Company Law after Centros: Is the EU on the Road to Delaware?
8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 323–41 (2002).
124. BGH: Rechtsfähigkeit niederländischer Gesellschaft bei Verwaltungssitzverlagerung, 11
EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 412 (2000).
125. Cf. para. 45 in Advocate General Colomer’s opinion in Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v.
Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), 2002 E.C.R. I-09919.
126. Id. at para. 55.
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“seat” of the company.127 Despite this apparent way out of the dilemma,
the ECJ refrained from using the escape, holding that, “[a] necessary precondition for the exercise of the freedom of establishment is the recognition
of those companies by any Member State in which they wish to establish
themselves.”128
My initial impression was that the ECJ’s reasoning resulted in an unnecessarily harsh treatment of Germany,129 however in the meantime, the
ECJ has clarified its position. In Inspire Art130 it became definitively clear
that the ECJ sought to provide enhanced guidance for the Europeanization
process. Inspire Art was a company incorporated in the United Kingdom
but which operated exclusively in the Netherlands. According to the Dutch
Wet op de Formeel Buitenlandse Vennootschappen131 (Law on Formally
Foreign Companies) of December 17, 1997, Inspire Art was required to
register in the Netherlands and to add that it is a formally foreign company,
which would nevertheless be subject to Dutch minimum capital and disclosure requirements, as well as provisions on the personal liability of the directors.
In its ruling, the Dutch disclosure provisions were held to be incompatible with secondary Community law.132 As to the rules on minimum
capital and the liability of directors, the ECJ concluded “that neither the
[Dutch] Chamber of Commerce nor the Netherlands Government has adduced any evidence to prove that the measure in question satisfies the criteria of efficacy, proportionality and non-discrimination mentioned. . . .[They
therefore] cannot be justified under Article 46 EC, or on grounds of protecting creditors, or combating improper recourse to freedom of establishment or safeguarding fairness in business dealings or the efficiency of tax
inspections.”133
What is left of private international law and its competing theories?
The ECJ’s reference to the rights guaranteed by the Treaty, to the supremacy of secondary legislation over national provisions on the same subject,
and, last but not least, the subjection of national legislation to European
127. Id. at para. 46.
128. Case C-208/00, Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. at para. 59.
129. See CHRISTIAN JOERGES, ON THE LEGITIMACY OF EUROPEANISING PRIVATE LAW:
CONSIDERATIONS ON A JUSTICE-MAKING LAW FOR THE EU MULTI-LEVEL SYSTEM 17 (European University Institute Working Paper Law No. 3003/3, 2003), available at http://www.iue.it/PUB/law033.pdf (last visited May 28, 2004); see also SCHMID, supra note 1, at 428.
130. Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd.
(Judgment of September 30, 2003), available at www.curia.europa.eu.
131. Staatsblad 1997, No. 697.
132. Case C-167/01, Inspire Art, 2003 E.C.R. at paras. 71, 72.
133. Case C-167/01, Inspire Art, 2003 E.C.R. at paras. 140, 142.
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standards of reasonableness, provide a Europeanization framework which
is superior to anything so far conceived under private international law.
This does not imply that all the objectives which were generally ascribed to
the seat theory—“requirements relating to the general interest, such as the
protection of the interests of creditors, minority shareholders, employees
and even the taxation authorities”134—would now have been outlawed.
They remain alive but must be reconsidered and substantiated anew in the
ECJ’s framework following Inspire Art.135
Germany’s codetermination law is the most difficult case. What would
be left of it if subjected to the standard the Court has adopted in Inspire
Art?136 There are reasons to believe that we need not find an answer to this
question. At first blush, codetermination seems to lead us into the kind of
dilemma that the recent Microsoft decision by the European Commission
presented137—that a company present in two jurisdictions is subjected to
the rules of one of them in such a way that the other jurisdiction’s policy is
subverted, be it de jure or de facto. Essentially, you either have codetermination or you don’t. If Volkswagen operates under a codetermination at
home and codetermination is considered bad, then all the countries in
which Volkswagen does business are essentially negatively affected.
What kind of conceptual framework could help to resolve the socioeconomic Kulturkampf between Germany’s traditions and the rest of the
world? Perhaps we should be content with the practices already developed.
Volkswagen has neither been confronted with requests to give up its commitments to codetermination nor has it threatened to leave the country because of the burdens codetermination imposes. Germany has not imposed
its codetermination laws on pseudoforeign corporations,138 but quite pa-

134. Case C-208/00, Überseering, 2002 E.C.R. at para. 92.
135. Erich Schanze and Andreas Jüttner consider these concerns exaggerated and rather unhelpful
for the development of a control theory moderated by European law. Erich Schanze & Andreas Jüttner,
Annerkennung und Kontrolle ausländischer Gesellschaften. Rechtslage und Perspektiven nach der
Uberseering-Entscheidung des EuGH, 2003 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT36; Cf. Peter Ulmer,
Schutzinstrumente gegen die Gefahren aus der Geschäftstätigkeit inländischer Zweigniederlassungen
von Kapitalgesellschaften mit fiktivem Auslandsbesitz, 54 (13) JURISTENZEITUNG 662 (1999).
136. For a comprehensive and thoughtful discussion, see Jens C. Dammann, Note, The Future of
Codetermination after Centros: Will German Corporate Law Move Closer to the U.S. Model?, 8
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 607 (2003).
137. Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft, Commission Decision of March 24, 2004, COM(04)900
final, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf (last
visited Jan. 31, 2005).
138. See Dammann, supra note 136, at 621.
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tiently sought to find a European framework within which its traditions
might survive.139
C. Diagonal Conflicts: “Invasions of the Market”?140
It is an important characteristic of the integration process that it effectively dissolves the links between private law and its regulatory environment.141 This disintegrative side-effect is an implication of a fundamental
constitutional principle of the European construct. The EU’s competencies
are restricted to the fields enumerated in the Treaty. The principle is uncontested in theory, but it is difficult to apply in practice. Indeed, realworld constellations generally do not proceed according to the lines drawn
by the drafters of the Treaty. It is typical in the European Union that the
European level is competent—sometimes even exclusively—to regulate
one aspect of a problem, whereas Member States remain competent to
regulate another. As a result, the term “diagonal conflict” is useful to distinguish such constellations from “vertical” conflict resolutions where
Community law trumps national law on the one hand, and from “horizontal” conflicts which arise from differences among the legal systems of
Member States and belong to the realm of private international law on the
other.
Examples are legion. I restrict myself to a discussion of two recent examples from fields in which the logic of market integration tends to jeopardize the individual policy objectives pursued by Member States. The examples concern the extent of private as opposed to public governance.
They do not deal with rules of private law, but rather an instrumentalization
of private governance arrangement in the context of public governance.
The first example addresses environmental policy objectives which have
not only been tolerated but actively pursued by the Community and the
second deals with a conflict between European privatization policies and
national distributive concerns in the field of public services. Both examples document the deepening and increasing complexity of the integration
project. The old harmonization policies through which the Community initially sought to ensure the equality and fairness of competitive conditions
are insufficient when it comes to policies of social and economic regulation
for which the Member States have retained competence.

139. For an overview, see Dieter Sadowski, Joachim Junkes & Sabine Lindenthal, The German
Model of Corporate and Labour Governance, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 33 (2000).
140. This term is borrowed from Steven Lukes, Invasions of the Market, in FROM LIBERAL VALUES
TO DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JÁNOS KIS ch. 4 (Ronald W. Dworkin ed., 2004).
141. See Joerges, supra notes 60 and 61.
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What discipline can the Community exert in such fields? Can it control the anticompetitive effects of national regulations? The complexity
and normative sensitivity of such issues render the tasks of the ECJ ever
more difficult. In principle, European law must respect national or regional
political preferences—the ECJ evinced such a respect, but only in the second example was the Court’s performance truly impressive.
1. Windmills in Schleswig Holstein. Germany’s governing coalition
has a common enemy, a common problem and a common hope. The common enemy is atomic energy, the common problem is coal, both black and
brown, and their hope lies in windmills. All three industries are heavily
subsidized. The government’s hope, however, is that the energy gained
from windmills will be increasingly competitive. It will take time and
money until the present technology is developed so that environmentally
friendly energy will be available at competitive prizes. The German government, especially the Ministry for the Protection of the Environment, believes that the objective is worth the effort. Yet, European law becomes a
factor by virtue of Article 87 of the EC Treaty which prohibits in principle
“any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form
whatsoever. . .”142
This is, of course, known to the German government and motivated
the specific legislative design of the Stromeinspeisungsgesetz (the law on
feeding electricity from renewable energy sources into the public grid) of
December 7, 1990,143 as amended in 1998.144 This law obliges regional
public electricity suppliers to purchase all the electricity produced within
their area of supply from renewable sources such as wind, water and sun
and to pay a fixed minimum price for that electricity which is higher than
that for other electricity. Moreover, the law obliges upstream suppliers of
electricity to pay partial compensation to those regional distribution undertakings for the additional costs caused by that purchase obligation.145
What is so clever about this legislative design? The German Federal
State and the state of Schleswig-Holstein are of course aware of European
state aid law. Article 87(1) EC Treaty prohibits in principle “any aid
142. Article 87(1) EU Treaty states that any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favoring certain
undertakings or the production of certain goods is, in so far as it affects trade between Member States,
incompatible with the common market.
EC TREATY art. 87 (as amended), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/legislation/treaties/ec/art87_en.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
143. BGB. 1990 I, 2633.
144. BGB. 1998 I, 730.
145. For a very detailed account of the legislative history and the controversies surrounding it cf.
the opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, delivered on October 26, 2000 in Case C-379/98, paras. 5–62.
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granted by a Member State or through State resources.” Article 87(2) and
(3) lists two groups as exceptions to the rule. One group enjoys per se legality under Article 87(2). Much more important and interesting is the second group which subjects aid schemes to an evaluation by the Commission
undertaken “in cooperation with the Member States” (Article 88). Article
88(3) obliges Member States to inform the Commission “of any plans to
grant or alter aid” in a timely manner so that the Commission can evaluate
such plans before they are put into effect.
The German government had notified the Commission of its legislative intentions in 1990 and received a letter from the Commission authorizing the notified draft, explaining that it was in accordance with the energy
policies of the EU and acceptable also because wind energy constituted
only a small segment of the market.146 In 1996, however, the Commission
had informed the German Ministry for the Economy of its doubts as to
whether in view of the increasing production of wind energy the Stromeinspeisungsgesetz was still compatible with the Treaty.147 The 1998 amendment had not yet been notified.148
The present conflict was, however, initiated by the private actors on
which the Stromeinspeisungsgesetz imposes the duty to use and to pay
wind energy. The plaintiff PreussenElektra AG complained about the compensation of the extra costs the local energy distributor Schleswag AG incurred when purchasing from renewable sources.149 PreussenElektra argued that the 1994 amendment of the Stromeinspeisungsgesetz, which had
not been notified to the Commission, should not be applied and could
hence not create an obligation to compensate Schleswag. As is apparent
from the fact that Schleswag was held as to 65.3 percent by PreussenElektra, the true addressee of the complaint was the German legislature whom
the parties sought to correct with the help of European law.150
Environmental protection is a mandatory Community objective [Articles 3 (1) (l) and 6)], just as it is a Staatsziel (objective of national interest)
in Germany. Thus, the conflict is not about the legitimacy of environmental protection, but rather is about the competence to weigh the pros and
cons of the Stromeinspeisung (i.e., the feeding of electricity from renewable energy sources into the public grid) policy. If the scheme of the German statute constituted a state aid in the sense of Article 87, it would, ac-

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Case C-379/98, PreussenElektra AG v. Schleswaf AG, 2001 E.C.R. I-02099, at para. 11.
Id. at para. 12.
Id. at para. 13.
Id. at paras. 20–21.
Id.
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cording to Article 88, be up to the Commission to supervise the weighing
between competitive and environmental rationality, and it could seek the
confirmation of its assessment by the ECJ.
Ever since 1993 and the Sloman Neptun cases151 the Court has chosen
to read Article 87 literally:
Only advantages granted directly or indirectly through state resources are
to be considered aid within the meaning of Article 87 (1). The distinction
made in that provision between ‘aid granted by a Member State’ and aid
granted ‘through state resources’ does not signify that all advantages
granted by a state, whether financed through state resources or not, constitute aid, but is intended merely to bring within that definition both advantages which are granted directly by the state and those granted by a
152
public or private body designated or established by the state.

This formalism, famously confirmed half a year later in Ferring,153 enabled
the ECJ to keep itself at a distance from the quarreling between national
and European governmental and nongovernmental actors, or so the ECJ
may hope. That hope is unfounded, the critics—most prominently by its
own Advocate Generals154—argued that the ECJ’s formalism is an unsound
judicial response to the governance arrangements modern state aid schemes
use.155 In PreussenElektra the ECJ remained unimpressed:
“[T]he case-law of the Court of Justice shows that only advantages
granted directly or indirectly through State resources are to be considered
aid within the meaning of Article 92(1). The distinction made in that
provision between ‘aid granted by a Member State and aid granted
‘through State resources does not signify that all advantages granted by a
State, whether financed through State resources or not, constitute aid but

151. Cases C-72/91 and C-73/91, Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts AG v. Seebetriebsrat Bodo Ziesemer,
1993 E.C.R. I-887. At issue was a measure enabling certain shipping undertakings flying the German
flag to subject seafarers who were nationals of non-member countries to working conditions and rates
of pay less favorable than those applicable to German nationals.
152. Case C-379/98, PreussenElektra, 2001 E.C.R. at para. 58.
153. Holding that a tax on direct sales imposed on pharmaceutical laboratories corresponds to the
additional costs incurred by wholesale distributors in discharging their public service obligation, Case
C-53/00, Ferring v. ACOSS, 2001 E.C.R. I-9067, at para. 27.
154. See Case C-80/00, Italian Leather SpA v. WECO Polstermöbel GmbH & Co., 2002 E.C.R.
I4995, at paras. 73 (Léger, AG); Case C-280/00, Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v. Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH, 2003 E.C.R. paras. 54 (Léger, AG). See also Case
C-126/01, Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie v. GEMO SA, 2003 E.C.R., paras. 87
(Jacobs, AG) and joined Cases C-34/01 to C-38/01, Enirisorse SpA v. Ministero delle Finanze, 2003
E.C.R. paras. 153 (Stix-Hackl, AG).
155. GERD SCHWENDINGER, DEUTSCHE RUNDFUNKGEBÜHREN—”STAATLICH ODER AUS
STAATLICHEN MITTELN GEWÄHRT”?
ZUGLEICH EINE KRITISCHE BESTANDSAUFNAHME DER
RECHTSPRECHUNG DES EUGH ZUR STAATLICHEN ZURECHENBARKEIT VON BEIHILFEN GEMÄß ART. 87
ABS. 1 EGV (European University Institute Working Paper Law No. 2003/5), available at
http://www.iue.it/PUB/law03-5.pdf (last visited May 28, 2004). Schwendinger comprehensively and
thoughtfully addresses the PreussenElektra case. Id. at 20.
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is intended merely to bring within that definition both advantages which
are granted directly by the State and those granted by a public or private
body designated or established by the State. . . .
In this case, the obligation imposed on private electricity supply undertakings to purchase electricity produced from renewable energy sources
at fixed minimum prices does not involve any direct or indirect transfer
of State resources to undertakings which produce that type of electric156
ity.”

This is in no way convincing. There are better ways available to balance
the tensions between Community concerns and the political autonomy of
Member States. The ECJ demonstrated this in its recent Altmark Trans
judgment.157
2. Daseinsvorsorge in Sachsen-Anhalt (Services of General Interest
in the Land of Sachsen-Anhalt). This judgment was awaited with anticipation throughout Europe because it concerned the broader constitutional dimensions of European state aid control and privatization policies. Altmark
Trans is a conflict about the reorganization of public transport—just one
example of the huge field of public interest services,158 organized differently throughout Europe in line with different national traditions and political priorities as services publiques in France, and as Daseinsvorsorge159 in
Germany.160 There is more at stake than a conflict over the competences at

156. Case C-379/98, paras. 58, 61. Another difficult, but less troubling as aspect of the judgment is
the Court’s handling of Article 28 in paras. 68–81. The German scheme was not available to foreign
suppliers. This seemed acceptable to the ECJ as it found, “the nature of electricity is such that, once it
has been allowed into the transmission or distribution system, it is difficult to determine its origin and in
particular the source of energy from which it was produced.” Id. at para. 79.
157. Case C-280/00, Altmark Trans, 2003 E.C.R.
158. The debate has raged for nearly a decade. See, e.g, Editorial: Public service obligations: A
blessing or a liability?, 33 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 395 (1996). On the legal significance of the
introduction of Aricle 16 by the Amsterdam Treaty see Ross, Article 16 and Services of General
Interest: From Derogation to Obligation?, 25 EUR. L. REV. 22 (2000).
159. The history of that term deserves to be mentioned briefly. The term was invented before 1933
by a highly respected philosopher (Karl Jaspers), then introduced into administrative law by Ernst
Forsthoff in 1938 in Daseinsvorsorge als Aufgabe der modernen Verwaltung, in ERNST FORSTHOFF,
DIE VERWALTUNG ALS LEISTUNGSTRÄGER (1938), cited from the reprint in ERNST FORSTHOFF,
RECHTSFRAGEN DER LEISTENDEN VERWALTUNG 23 (1959).
160. Public services can be defined as “services or activities, recognised as public in the sense that
the State is seen as ultimately responsible for the provision of them, [but which] are nevertheless not
provided by the State itself but by institutions which are intermediate between the market and the State.
These institutions are, on the one hand, too independent of the State to be regarded as part of the State,
but are, on the other hand, too closely and distinctly associated with the goals, activities, and responsibilities of the State to be though of as simply part of the private sector of the political economy”; thus
Mark Freedland, Law, Public Services, and Citizenship—New Domains, New Regimes, in PUBLIC
SERVICES AND CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPEAN LAW: PUBLIC AND LABOUR LAW PERSPECTIVES 3 (Mark
Freedland & Silvana Sciarra eds., 1999). This definition already presupposes that these services are no
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different levels of government or the further development of environmental
policies. What makes the European involvement in this field so interesting
and sensitive are notions of social justice. The northern European welfare
states which have so far successfully reorganized and defended their social
models, would have to surrender aspects of their welfare state models if
European law could insist on privatization policies which render their support of public services illegal. The problems are of course complex. It is
hardly disputed that so many public services deserve to be reorganized.
That reorganization will have to ensure that non-local suppliers get access
to publicly cofinanced service markets. There are many more reasons to
welcome outside intervention and at might be that it is only thanks to the
assignment of supervisory function to the European level of governance
that the reform can be carried out successfully161—a long road to be sure,
but Altmark Trans is a promising beginning.
Altmark Trans GmbH and Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH
both sought to organise public transport in the Landkreis of Stendal in
Sachsen Anhalt, one of the new East German states (Länder). Altmark
Trans had been licensed, and procured renewal by the Regierungspräsidium (governmental authority of the Land), whereas the bid of Nahverkehrsgesellschaft was rejected.162 The ECJ was asked to delineate the
scope of European secondary legislation and the competencies of the German legislature. The core issue, to which the ECJ responded, was the characterization of the German support scheme. The ECJ opinion builds from
well-known definitions of state aid but then take two innovative steps.
With the first, the ECJ reduces the supervisory powers of the European
Commission by expressly accepting that it is up to the national authorities
to define the public interest and to pay compensation for so-defined services:
Measures which, whatever their form, are likely directly or indirectly to
favor certain undertakings or are to be regarded as an economic advan-

longer provided by administrative bodies but are privatized to a certain degree. It is general enough to
cover various forms of “public-private partnerships” through which these services may be organized
and, most importantly, it does not prescribe the public involvement in the provision of such services.
This it cannot do because legal traditions, social expectations, political preferences, and administrative
know-how all differ widely between Sicily and Mecklenburg, between Scotland and Greece, Estonia
and Burgundy—and these differences have to be taken into account in the efforts which the Commission has initiated to reorganize them.
161. The most important recent official documents are: European Commission’s Communication:
Communication on Services of General Interest of Sept. 11, 1996, COM(96)443 final; Report on Services of General Interest of 17 October 2001, COM(01)598 final; Green Paper on Services of General
Interest of 21 May 2003, COM(03)270 final.
162. See Case C-280/00, Altmark, 2003 E.C.R. at para. 21.
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tage which the recipient undertaking would not have obtained under
163
normal market conditions are regarded as aid.”

However, “where a State measure must be regarded as compensation for
the services provided by the recipient undertakings in order to discharge
public service obligations, so that those undertakings do not enjoy a real
financial advantage and the measure thus does not have the effect of putting them in a more favorable competitive position than the undertakings
competing with them, such a measure is not caught by Article 92(1) of the
Treaty.”164
The Court subjects the non-application of the state aids regime to four
conditions: (1) the recipient must be required to discharge clearly defined
public service obligations; (2) the parameters of the calculated compensation must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner;
(3) the compensation must not exceed costs plus a reasonable profit; and
(4) decisions are to be taken either after a public procurement procedure or
the level of compensation is to be determined on the basis of an analysis of
the costs of typical undertaking, well run and adequately provided with
adequate means of transport.165
What is innovative about this holding is the redesign of the relations
between the various levels of governance in the European Union. The ECJ
has opened the door for policy pluralism within the Union while at the
same time relieving the Commission from a supervisory burden that it
would hardly be able to cope with anyway. To be sure, the new criteria the
ECJ has spelled out must be refined further, but the prospects for productive contestation over the organization of public services have improved
dramatically.
III. THE SEARCH FOR LEGITIMIZATION IN THE
EUROPEANIZATION PROCESS
Section I of this essay concluded after mere theoretical deliberation
that the Europeanization process will require the development of a new discipline which would conceptualize Europe as a multilevel system of governance, overcoming the legacy of methodological nationalism in European
law, comparative law and private international law. The case studies in
Section II can be read as confirming the utility of that analytical framework. Yet the practice of the ECJ has a utility of its own. This practice
cannot be expected to fit neatly into the analytical and interpretative

163. Id. at para. 84 (citations omitted).
164. Id. at para. 87.
165. Id. at paras. 88-93.
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schemes through which we have traditionally observed it. The kind of confirmation we can expect is primarily negative in the sense that the ECJ’s
jurisprudence is in fact often moving beyond the horizons of conventional
legal doctrines. The messages implicit in this jurisprudence do not, however, reveal a coherent set of responses to the problematic of multilevel
governance. How are we to interpret them?
Three steps will be undertaken to answer this question. The first two
concern the theoretical framework of this essay. The analytics of multilevel governance will be presented in more detail.166 What then follows is
a translation of the political science language into legal categories167 and a
refinement of the normative perspectives sketched out at the end of the introductory section.168 These perspectives will be concretized further in the
concluding comments on the case studies.
A. The European Polity as a “Multi-level System of Governance sui
generis”
“Less than a federation, more than a regime”—despite dating from
1983, this characterization of the European polity by William Wallace
dates is not outdated.169 Integration research continues to oscillate between
federation and regime and the search for a positive definition of what the
European Union is continues. The notion en vogue today is a step forward.
Students of the Integration Project have suggested, for some time now, that
the EU is to be understood as a “multi-level system of governance”—akin
to federations and other systems of governance. What, then, is specific—
sui generis—about the European system? This question is at the core of a
very rich debate.170 The specification that I am relying on stresses the nonhierarchical network character of the system—arguing that this perceived
weakness is also a potential strength. Because the powers and also, to
some degree, the resources for political action, are located at various and
relatively autonomous levels dispersed throughout the Union, the responses
to functionally interwoven problems must be developed through communi166. See discussion supra I.D.
167. For a more general and subtle discussion of such interdisciplinary borrowings see GUNTHER
TEUBNER, NETZWERK ALS VERTRAGSVERBUND 17–22 (2004).
168. See discussion supra I.E.
169. William Wallace, Less than a Federation, More than a Regime: The Community as a Political
System, in POLICY-MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 403–36 (Helen Wallace & William Wallace eds., 1983).
170. For recent summaries, see Markus Jachtenfuchs, The Governance Approach to European Integration, 39 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 245 (2001); Fritz W. Scharpf, Notes: Toward a Theory of Multilevel Governing in Europe, 24 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 1 (2001); MARKUS JACHTENFUCHS &
BEATE KOHLER-KOCH, EUROPÄISCHE INTEGRATION 11, 18 (2d ed. 2003).
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cations between actors who are genuinely competent in their various domains. No longer does this lock us in what Fritz Scharpf has famously
characterized as Europe’s “joint-decision trap” over two decades ago.171
Institutional innovations and learning have instead lead to a much more favorable constellation. Jürgen Neyer172 argues—and he is representative of
this school of thought173—that, in the specific conditions of the European
Union, successful solutions to problems can be expected from “deliberative” modes of communication based on universal motivations tied to rules
and principles. What Neyer underlines in his analysis can be characterized
as the “facticity”—the actual impact—of normativity. The insight that the
multilevel analysis portrays constellations that legal science confronts in a
similar fashion, has gained ground over a number of years.174 The normative turn that Neyer gives to the multilevel approach, enhances its accessibility and attractiveness for lawyers considerably. It gives credit to the assumption that European governance is not inconceivable by relying on
deliberative interaction instead of the formation of hierarchies.
B. Integration through Deliberation as an Alternative to Orthodox Supranationalism
It is a small step from such theorizing to an interpretation of legal provisions as precepts for a communication-oriented, “deliberative” political
style which can be easily explained in a broader context—in our “post171. Fritz W. Scharpf, The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European
Integration, 66 PUB. ADMIN. 239–78 (1988).
172. See J. Neyer, Discourse and Order in the EU: A Deliberative Approach to Multi-Level Governance, 41 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. (2003). Neyer elaborates further in J. NEYER, POSTNATIONALE
POLITISCHE HERRSCHAFT: VERGESELLSCHAFTUNG UND VERRECHTLICHUNG JENSEITS DES STAATES
(2004).
173. INTEGRATION THROUGH DELIBERATION? ON THE PROSPECTS FOR EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY
(Erik O. Eriksen & John E. Fossum eds., 2000); DEVELOPING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE (Erik O.
Eriksen et al. eds., 2004).
174. See, e.g., Ingolf Pernice, Multi-level Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European Constitution-Making Revisited?, 36 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 703 (1999); FURRER, supra
note 60, at 56, 155, and accompanying references. Oddly and inexplicably, the comparative law tradition seems less impressed by all this than conflict of laws scholarship. At the same time, there exists a
conceptualization of the EU as a multi-level system demonstrates with particular emphasis on mutual
influences between regulatory systems and the restructuring of international relations. Of course, generalizing judgments in a discipline can always be falsified. The law will respond in some way real
problems and legal science in turn will reflect on them, explicitly or more implicitly. Compare with
further references by Watt, supra note 59); Ralf Michaels, Im Westen nichts neues? Zum Stand der
Rechstvergleichung 100 Jahre nach dem Pariser Kongress—Gedanken anlässlich einer
Jubiläumskonferenz in New Orleans [Nothing new in the West? On the State of Comparative Law 100
Years after the Paris Congress—Reflections on the Occasion of a Centennial Conference in New
Orleans], 66 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 97
(2002).
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national constellations,” typified by economic interpenetration and interdependency, the extraterritorial effects of the decisions and omissions of democratic polities are simply unavoidable; yet the burdens imposed unilaterally on one’s neighbor cannot be sufficiently legitimated by “democratic”
processes which are internal to the state. It may seem like a paradox, but it
has become an irrefutable insight—nation states cannot act democratically.
“No taxation without representation”—this is a principle that imposes on
the Member States of the EU the obligation to take account of the interests
and concerns of non-nationals even within the national polity.175 “Deliberative” supranationalism is an alternative to orthodox notions of supranationalism which have underlined the autonomy of European law and its supremacy over national law. It also deviates from the “integration-throughlaw” tradition, in that it seeks to overcome the law-politics dichotomy inherent in J. H. H. Weiler’s famous distinction between legal supranationalism and political intergovernmentalism.176
The normative core message of Deliberative Supranationalism is that
Europe, through its supranational rules and principles, should give voice to
“foreign” concerns and insist that Member States mutually “recognize”
their laws (essentially that they “apply” foreign law) and refrain from insisting on their lex fori and domestic interests. The discipline this principle
seeks to impose on a Member State’s political autonomy is limited.177 The

175. See Joerges, The Impact of European Integration, supra note 60, at 390.
176. J.H.H. Weiler, The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism, in 1 Y.B.
EUR. L. 257–306 (1981).
177. See the analyses by FURRER, supra note 60, at 171; JOHANNES FETSCH, EINGRIFFSNORMEN
UND EG-VERTRAG 126, 139 (2002). For a discussion of the conflict of laws principles, see id. at 21,
71. See SCHMID, supra note 1, at 167. For a heuristic using American conflict of law methodologies
for the structuring of European Kollisionsrecht see Christian Joerges, “Deliberative Supranationalism”—Two Defences, 8 EUR. L.J. 133, 135 (2002), with references especially to Brainerd Currie, Notes
on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Law, in BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 177 (1963); Brainerd Currie, Comment on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
1233, 1242 (1963). I have no difficulty with characterizing the mediation between differences in regulatory policies and the diverse interests of the concerned jurisdictions that ECJ’s jurisprudence has so
often achieved as a truly European law of conflict of laws. The decisive difference with Currie’s thinking is the turn to deliberation as a mode of legitimizing the resolution of conflicts. Currie insisted that
“[the C]hoice between the competing interests of co-ordinated states is a political function of a high
order, which ought not, in a democracy, to be committed to the judiciary: . . . the court is not equipped
to perform such a function; and the Constitution specifically confers that function upon Congress.”
Brainerd Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial
Function, in BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 188, 272 (1963). Deliberative Supranationalism advocates exactly that—It is “deliberative” in that it does not content itself
with appealing to the supremacy of European law; it is European because it seeks to identify principles
and rules which make differing laws in the EU compatible; with this ambition it stands “above” national
law, because it indicates and declares binding a metanorm under which intra-European conflicts can be
resolved. For a more detailed elaboration see Joerges, Deliberative Supranationalism—Two Defences,
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principle and its limitations can be discovered and studied best in the jurisprudence on Article 30 (now 28). The ECJ has so often convincingly demonstrated178 how the idiosyncrasies of individual states can be identified as
such and reduced to a civilized level—autonomieschonend und gemeinschaftsverträglich (protective of autonomy and compatible with the Community).179
What can be achieved through an enlightened interpretation of Article
28 of the EC Treaty is a resolution of frictions among national jurisdictions.
But this is a very incomplete characterization of the challenges European
law faces. Three interdependent complications need to be outlined.
There is a need to find a mechanism for the reconciliation of a broader
variety of conflicting policies and legal traditions. The “orthodox” answer
to such constellations has been “harmonization”—a search for uniformity
which would rule out future conflicts. This was the strategy of the ECJ in
the product liability cases discussed above.180 Its answer was neither
workable nor normatively attractive. Legislative acts like the Product Liability Directive are selective interventions into complex legal fields. Such
acts may at best cause some irritation;181 where rules are so specific as
those of the product liability directive to which the ECJ ascribed preemptive effects, the intervention will have disintegrative consequences
which damage the normative coherence of an entire field of law.
Is ever more comprehensive harmonization—in the case of private
law, a European code—a promising alternative, as so many observers believe?182 If so, how comprehensive should such a code be? The propo-

supra, at 135 and Christian Joerges, Constitutionalism and Transnational Governance: Exploring a
Magic Triangle, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM § 1.3.2 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004).
178. See, e.g., M. MADURO POIARES, WE THE COURT 150 (1998); J.H.H. WEILER, THE
CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE 221 (1999).
179. Fritz W. Scharpf, Autonomieschonend und gemeinschaftsverträglich. Zur Logik der
europäischen Mehrebenenpolitik, in FRITZ W. SCHARPF, OPTIONEN DES FÖDERALISMUS IN
DEUTSCHLAND UND EUROPA (1994), 131. As a follow-up to introductory note **, I may point to
analogies and contrasts in Brainerd Currie’s conflict-of-laws theories even though the comparison may
seem at first glance far-fetched. Currie was a “methodological nationalist” in his insistence on the importance of the lex fori and his plea for the defense of “governmental interests” by courts. But in his
later writings, he has allowed for a “moderate and restrained interpretation” of state interests so as to
“avoid” conflicts. See Currie, Comment on Babcock v. Jackson, supra note 177, at 1242; Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754, 763 (1963). On the related term
“avoidable conflicts” see DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 73 (1965).
180. See discussion supra Section II.A.
181. As in the case of the good faith principle of the unfair contract terms directive, analyzed by
Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law Or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences, 62 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1999).
182. See discussion supra Section I.A.
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nents of a European code pay little attention to the “regulatory embeddedness” of private law. The present state of that relation mirrors Europe’s
multilevel governance. Whereas the traditional core areas of private law
have retained much of their familiar grammar, the institutional frameworks
of the private economy and the concomitant regulatory activities have been
“Europeanized.” Thus, Europeanization has radically altered the overall
legal (and normative) environment in which private law operates. This discrepancy between the apparent survival of private law institutions has led
to an erosion of their social function which is often neglected.183 If this observation is valid, does it not become ever more plausible to opt for a European code? I have characterized the discrepancies between (European)
regulatory provisions and national private law as “diagonal” conflicts.184 It
has become apparent, albeit only in the specific fields under scrutiny here,
that there are alternatives available to uniformity. It is possible, so we have
argued, to retain diversity and to nevertheless ensure the workability of the
internal market.185 This alternative is normatively attractive because it respects the political autonomy of lower levels of governance.
Yet it is not merely a normative preference for diversity and for a decentralized Europe which motivate this plea for caution. A further objection against codification stems from the logic of justification institutionalized in our systems of private law and adjudication on the one hand and in
the fields of regulatory policies on the other. Regarding the latter,186 the
prerogatives of the European in all fields of economic and social regulation
level have led to the establishment of complex transnational governance arrangements involving European and national, governmental and nongovernmental actors. These governance arrangements accomplish a continuous supervision of the regulated fields, flexible responses to changes,
and the revision of agreed upon standards. The nature and legitimacy of
regulatory policies is distinct and each field follows a dynamics of its own.
The links and potential tensions within private law vary broadly. One particularly interesting example is the present “modernization” of European
competition policy,187 which will affect its impact on private law—
183. See Joerges, The Impact of European Integration, supra note 60; Christian Joerges, European
Challenges to Private Law: On False Dichotomies, True Conflicts and the Need for a Constitutional
Perspective, 18 LEGAL STUD. 146–66 (1998).
184. See II.C supra.
185. Supra II.C and II.B.
186. On the follwing in more detail Christian Joerges & Michelle Everson, Law, Economics and
Politics in the Constitutionalization of Europe, in ERIK O. ERIKSEN ET AL., DEVELOPING A
CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE, 162–79.
187. See Council Regulation 1/2003 on the Implementation of the Rules on Competition, 2003 O.J.
(L 1) and the officious explanations by Emil Paulis, Latest Commission Thinking Progress on the Mod-
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especially on contract law—considerably. The regulation of product risks
and standardization are fields which underwent dramatic changes during
the last decade and are unlikely to come to rest in the foreseeable future. In
all fields of regulatory policy, Europe must balance centralization, coordination, and decentralization. It has relegated the adaptation of private law
to the European regulatory environment, to national legal systems, and especially to national courts. If flexibility is both a necessity and a goal of
regulatory policy, more legislative uniformity in private law or its codification hardly seems desirable.
Private law systems are different in many ways, but not in their need
for flexibility and their need to seek legitimacy in the processes of law production. That production is not confined to the application of previously
given rules; nor does it operate in full autonomy. It is exposed to a continuing discourse with interested parties, experts and academics—and to
the threat of legislative interventions. The legitimacy and rationality of the
interplay of legislation, case law, scholarship and political discourse is the
resource which generates its legitimacy.188 This resource is not available in
the European polity because that polity remains heterarchical. European
law is legitimated to instigate innovation and change, to organize diversity,
and to ensure the compatibility of diversity with Community concerns—its
vocation is not to produce uniformity.189
C. Europeanization as Process
To summarize this lengthy argument: The complexity of the Europeanization process is nobody’s “mistake.” It is not by chance that we witness such a multifaceted mixture of “primary law” which grants basic freedoms and rights; transnational governance arrangements which organize
regulatory activities; and legislative and judicial interventions which irritate. This mixture is the State of the (European) Union. It is by no means a
comfortable situation, yet it has great potential—at least in theory. Its performance to date has not been so bad—at least in the examples we have examined here.
ernization of Antitrust, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW: A NEW ROLE FOR THE MEMBER STATES 15–
31 (2001).
188. See Rudolf Wiethölter, Zum Fortbildungsrecht der (richterlichen) Rechtsfortbildung: Fragen
eines lesenden Recht-Fertigungslehrers, 3 KRITISCHE VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT FÜR GESETZGEBUNG
For American law see PHILIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL
UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 1 (1988).
COMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY 450 (1992).
189. A further parallel between regulatory policy and private law is the turn governance alluded to
in the text. What is so characteristic of all areas of regulatory politics, namely the inclusion of nongovernmental actors, is currently happening in all fields of economic regulation—and it is unlikely that
a European code will be able reach into these important practical spheres of modern legal systems.
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The ECJ’s recent product liability cases can be interpreted as a move
back into orthodox supranationalism. But this is a worst case scenario.
The Court will realize that the European product liability law directive is a
relatively insignificant element in a complex web of product safety law and
regulation which, in Europe, is intimately related to semi-private Europeanized standardization activities. It is of course a highly contested sphere, but
none of the stakeholders are likely to encourage the ECJ to take the 1985
directive as a basis from which European level of governance would seize
control of legal developments.
The Centros jurisprudence, however, is of another caliber. Here, the
ECJ has transformed the freedoms ensured by the EC Treaty into a true
European citizenship by empowering the Untertan (subject) of a Member
State to bring his or her own sovereign to court and force national governments to provide justification for their regulatory practices. The Court also
has managed to create a legal framework linking the various levels of
European governance without assigning comprehensive KompetenzKompetenz—the power to determine one’s range of competencies—to any
of them.
The ECJ has performed less well in its reaction to the tensions between European state aid policies on the one hand, and national environmental concerns and industrial policy objectives on the other in the
PreussenElektra case.190 Its restrictive definition of state aid allows flexibility for legislative strategies by national policy makers which avoid any
contestation.191 This type of judicial self-restraint has been followed and
corrected by a much more promising strategy in the Altmark Trans judgment. The reform of public services (services publiques, Daseinsvorsorge)
need not have uniform results. Legal traditions, social expectations, political preferences, and administrative know-how differ widely between Sicily
and Estonia, between Scotland and Greece. Europe can continue to initiate
further changes and foster social learning at the same time. This is its
mandate—the imposition of uniform regimes would be a nightmare.192
Europeanization is about social learning through conflict management
and contestation. The role of law in such a law in that process is essential.
But the law itself must learn how to find principles and provide procedures
which organize the interactions between political actors and courts at varying levels of governance, and must function to both accompany and legitimate social change. This is both a challenge and an opportunity.

190. See discussion supra.
191. See II.C.1 supra.
192. See II.C.2 supra.

